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Foreword
The 3rd Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Seattle was not able to
launch a new and comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations, but it is expected that in the
coming years the WTO will be the forum of these negotiations, commonly referred to as the
Millennium Round. Developing countries are currently greatly involved in the WTO process and seek
active participation in this round.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has for several years assisted the
developing countries in assessing the consequences of the previous Uruguay Round Agreements on
their agricultural sector and in preparing for the new round of trade negotiations. The FAO has also
supported research in this area, and in 1995 it commissioned the Centre for World Food Studies
(SOW-VU) to conduct, in cooperation with experts from Ethiopia and with the Ethiopian government,
a study on the possible impact of the Uruguay Round Agreements on food and agriculture in
developing countries, with special reference to Ethiopia. The project (GCP/ETH/053/NET) was
entitled ‘Adapting Food and Agricultural Policies to a Changing External Trade Environment.’
Focusing on the trade flows of six commodities that are of special relevance to Ethiopia, the study
assessed the consequences of the WTO rules on domestic policies with respect to food and
agriculture, and identified a set of policy measures that would enable Ethiopia to make better use of
the new trading environment. Ethiopia is not a WTO Member as yet, but the analyses reported in the
paper remain valid if Ethiopia were a WTO Member. 
In spring 1999, the Centre was requested by FAO to undertake a follow up study, reviewing
unfinished business of the previous Uruguay Round as well as new issues, both in relation to least
developed countries in Africa, and with Ethiopia as country for a case study, while incorporating the
main findings of the earlier study. This is the subject of the present paper.
The paper argues that the Agreement on Agriculture, part of the Uruguay Round Agreements, has put
a system of basic mechanisms into place but not led to significant agricultural trade liberalization.
Developing countries were not affected much either, as the rules applying to them were less stringent
and contained many exemptions for least developed countries. They currently seek continuation of
their special and differential treatment, but more importantly would like to see the new round focus on
development by paying due attention to their specific constraints for being competitive rather than on
trade liberalization itself. At the same time, a host of new issues have emerged since 1994 that relate
directly or indirectly to food and agriculture. First, regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and
Mercosur can interfere with the multilateral negotiations, and the same holds for the regional trade
agreements through which the EU intends to continue its preferential arrangements with ACP
countries. Second, new non-tariff barriers for developing countries might result from consumer
concerns about product safety and quality, or about modes of production such as labor standards and
environmental sustainability. Finally, knowledge related goods (pharmaceuticals, seeds, software)
pose new challenges, to balance the protection of intellectual property rights for producers with basic
needs of consumers in developing countries. The report highlights the various interactions between
these subjects from the perspective of Ethiopia.
Rodrigo Santa Cruz Michiel Keyzer
Director Director
Policy Assistance Division Centre for World Food Studies
Food and Agriculture Organization Vrije Universiteit
Rome, Italy Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Despite current difficulties in reaching agreement on an agenda the World Trade
Organization (WTO) intends to start a new round of multilateral trade negotiations known as the
Millennium Round, which is scheduled to include trade in agricultural commodities and services,
and will possibly be broadened to cover other topics such as consumer concerns and intellectual
property rights. Both topics are of major concern to developing countries, since they define the
access to markets for exports and the access to knowledge.
2. The Uruguay Round Agreements for the first time included trade in agricultural
commodities. As many developing countries derive most of their export earnings from trade in
agricultural commodities, the GATT/WTO agenda is of great importance to them.
3. The present report reviews the present status of implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreements,  the issues pending as well as new issues with special reference to least developed
countries (LDCs) in Africa, with Ethiopia as a case study.
Present status of Uruguay Round Agreements
4. The Uruguay Round Agreements specify that developing countries, and the LDCs in
particular, will continue to receive Special and Differential Treatment, consisting mainly of
relaxations of the reduction requirements for import tariffs, export subsidies and agricultural
support. A developing country can implement the specified reductions over a longer period. The
reduction requirements are also weaker and include exemptions for items such as public
investments for development and agricultural input subsidies.
5. On agriculture, the Uruguay Round Agreements stipulate that all forms of import barriers
are to be converted to fixed tariffs. As major exception to this rule, minimum access quota should
be granted at low tariffs, according to country specific schedules of commitments. Tariff ceilings
are to be reduced gradually over time, but the LDCs are exempted from this obligation, while
most developing countries do not need to reduce them, since this is the first time they bound their
tariffs. The agreement also specifies how to measure aggregate support to agriculture (AMS),
which is not allowed to rise for the LDCs and to be reduced for the other countries. Similar
reduction rules hold for subsidized exports.
6. The general reduction of tariffs causes the value of trade preferences of developing
countries to diminish, and implies a loss for several developing countries in Africa. Despite
pledges to consider carefully the negative effects of Uruguay Round Agreements for LDCs, no
explicit financial compensation mechanism has been worked out.
7. The period 1995-1999 during which Uruguay Round Agreements have been implemented,
did on average not show the improvement of the international prices of agricultural commodities
in real terms that had been anticipated. Confounding factors may have been the crises in Asia and
Russia as well as climatic variability, but another reason might be that the agreement led to little
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effective improvement in import access. Its major contribution is to have put the mechanism of
future agricultural trade liberalization in place.
8. The Dispute Settlement Undertaking (DSU) of the Uruguay Round Agreements offers all
WTO members an easy access to a unified procedure that covers all multilateral agreements.
Developing countries have increasingly invoked the procedure, and were relatively successful,
even in cases against developed countries.
Ethiopia and WTO
9. In Ethiopia agriculture is, like in many other LDCs, the major economic sector in terms of
value added, employment and exports. Coffee, hides and skins are the main export goods.
Population is growing fast and the scope for expansion of the cultivated area is limited, but there
is significant room for yield improvement.
10. Since the change in government in 1991, Ethiopia has implemented a variety of structural
reforms under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, whose
conditionalities with respect to trade liberalization appear to be stricter than those of the WTO.
The domestic economy has been liberalized, import tariffs have been reduced, export subsidies
abolished and privatization of state owned enterprises has started.
11. When corrected for purchasing power parity, GDP growth reached 6.1 per cent over the
period 1992-’96 but in view of successive devaluations of the Birr, no growth could be recorded
in US dollar terms.
12. Ethiopia currently only participates in the WTO as an observer. WTO rules would impose
few restrictions on current economic policies due to the many exemptions applicable for LDCs
and to Ethiopia’s policy reforms since 1991. The current development projects for coffee, cereals
and livestock are fully exempted from the reduction requirements. For its processed products,
Ethiopia is allowed to maintain the export subsidies incorporated in the prevailing duty drawback
scheme, until the country becomes competitive on the world markets for the commodities
concerned, which might soon become the case for processed skins of sheep and goats.
13. Present WTO rules imply that Ethiopia’s initial AMS is very low, which limits the scope
for introducing agricultural support policies such as floor prices. To maintain maximal room for
its domestic policies, Ethiopia could consider notifying its AMS, as any other nominal amount in
its schedule of notification, in euros rather than in domestic currency. Policies to stabilize the
domestic food prices are also restricted by WTO rules on import tariffs, though present
agricultural imports largely consist of food aid, that are exempted from tariff restrictions.
14. Ethiopian representatives emphasize that the alleviation of supply constraints remains the
main concern of the Ethiopian government. In this perspective, development assistance and the
strengthening of the special and differential treatment play a central role. And yet, it is also in
their interests that unfinished business and new issues be attended to during the next round.
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Unfinished business
15. Ethiopia is, like many other LDCs, asking for continuation of the Special and Differential
Treatment under a new WTO trade agreement.
16. African LDCs would generally benefit from improved access to the markets of developed
countries, particularly to the EU whose present Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) imposes
severe restrictions. Ethiopia would gain from increased opportunities to export fruits, vegetables
and possibly sugar. Although its livestock potential is large, it will prove difficult to improve the
quality of meat and dairy products and it seems almost impossible to raise it to a level that can
meet the strict sanitary standards of many importing countries overseas.
17. Multi-functionality may be a promising approach to articulate Green Box policies. It allows
the EU and other OECD countries to acquire sufficient political backing domestically for
agricultural policy reforms that increase foreign access to their markets. Under this approach,
farmers receive payment for the environmental and other services they provide, preferably
directly from the consumer, but possibly through local taxes (e.g. a tourist tax). If sufficient
revenue can be mobilized in this way, it becomes possible to eliminate all price support, and to
increase import access without undermining the viability of the European countryside as
subsidies could be limited to general developmental efforts in less favored regions.
18. Within the CAP, sugar has so far escaped any reform. For this sector, elimination of all
import protection would virtually mean eradication, mainly because the sugar factories, rather
than the farmer, would face foreclosure. A reform that would leave a significant part of the sector
in operation is likely to gain more support. Such a reform might include reduction of production
quotas, which could eventually create some room for expanding imports from developing
countries, either on preferential terms, or with an import tariff whose proceeds could be
earmarked for development assistance.
19. LDCs would also benefit if (some) WTO members instituted the legal changes that would
make WTO regulations admissible in ordinary courts. Currently, traders have to convince their
own government of the need to file a complaint, which they may find difficult. Moreover, if many
of them are successful, the large number of complaints will soon overburden the WTO.
Furthermore, making WTO regulations admissible in civil courts also allows to impose serious
sanctions, and to maintain, through jurisprudence, sufficient dynamism in the interpretation of
earlier agreements.
New issues
20. While multilateral trade liberalization is the professed consensus at the start of the
Millennium Round, new regional agreements abound which in many respects contradict this
view. The EU for example intends to organize its development cooperation through treaties with
specified regional groupings (REPAs) and to grant trade preferences to these groupings. The
approach is controversial because of the trade diversion and new protection it can generate. Some
call it a stepping stone, others a stumbling block to further trade liberalization. Like other
developing countries Ethiopia mainly objects that the regional groupings should emerge
spontaneously on the basis of cooperation between neighbors, rather than because donors want to
reorganize their framework of cooperation.
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21. Consumer concerns prevailing in developed countries lead to product differentiation and
vertical integration along the food chains, from field to table. These concerns pertain to
characteristics of the food product itself such as safety or taste, as well as to moral aspects of the
technology (labor standards, animal welfare, and environmental sustainability). They offer
developing countries new opportunities to supply higher priced qualities, such as organic food,
but also impose severe requirements on product grading and labeling. These might be too
cumbersome for developing countries to implement, and could thus develop into new non-tariff
barriers, much like the current phyto-sanitary standards. Then, developing countries could
become mere producers of raw materials, relegated to the bottom end of the chain where they can
only supply low priced bulk products, while processors and retailers earn the rent from product
differentiation. Hence, it is important for developing countries to acquire sufficient control over
the chains in which they operate, possibly through joint ventures. The WTO could contribute by
imposing some order in the issue of labeling, by promoting standards, and by avoiding unfair
assignment of the burden of proof when satisfaction of a standard is being challenged.
22. Production processes become increasingly dependent on knowledge creation. In
agriculture, seed development is a case in point. LDCs have to choose between low yielding
traditional varieties that can multiply, and high yielding varieties that cannot  and whose seeds
have to be purchased from a handful of multinational companies. The same holds for pesticides
and for the pharmaceuticals in livestock production. For the WTO, this problem creates a dual
task. The first is to ensure that Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are being protected. This is also
in the interest of developing countries because it will promote the orientation of research to their
needs. The second is to see to it that respect of IPRs, and more generally the elimination of tariffs,
does not create new monopolies and monopolistic rents, in short, to develop an effective
international equivalent of national competition policies.
Chapter 1
Introduction
In Seattle, between 30th November and 3rd December 1999, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
organized a ministerial conference marked to establish the agenda of the Millennium1 Round, a
new round of international trade negotiations. The Millennium Round is the successor of the
Uruguay Round which resulted in the Uruguay Round Agreements and the establishment of the
WTO, and extended to the agricultural and services sectors. It might seem that with the
establishment of the WTO as a permanent institution the need for further multilateral rounds has
diminished, as member countries can now meet regularly to discuss upcoming issues, to set up
specialized committees on contentious subjects and to reach compromises. Moreover, as the 1994
agreement laid down the basic rules for trade liberalization, one could expect that all attention can
be devoted to the effective implementation of the reduction of bound tariffs as pledged by the
participants and the dispute settlement procedure of arbitrage by independent panels.
Nonetheless, it became already clear during the 1996 ministerial conference in Singapore that a
new multilateral round was required because the internal process would be incapable of
generating sufficient momentum to resolve outstanding issues and to table new ones. Hence, it
was decided to start a new round that should deal with trade in agricultural commodities and
services, and possibly be broadened to cover other topics to be decided upon at the Seattle
conference. But no agreement could be reached on the agenda of the round.
The official conference was preceded by a symposium to encourage an informal dialogue
with the NGOs. Over ten thousand representatives of NGOs, trade unions and action groups came
to Seattle for the occasion, signaling that the WTO round has become a major international forum
for economic consultations. But the mood was not always friendly. For many NGOs, the WTO
has almost become synonym to globalization, and all forces opposed to multinational capitalism
as epitomized by McDonald’s and Monsanto joined in an attempt to stop the multilateral process
of trade liberalization. Preservation of local identity is their common denominator and includes
safeguard of historical heritage as well as ecological diversity. Specifically, the opponents fear a
global monoculture and reject WTO’s endeavors to promote international comparability and
standardization of products, which promotes international competition and rewards the winners
but neglects the contribution of the losers. Some critics claim that WTO induced liberalization
tends to promote monopoly, with tariffs replaced by new rents hidden in patents, brands and
hermetically closed production chains. Others point out that in developing countries and
economies in transition the process of trade liberalization and deregulation has only led to
contraction because its causes disruption of existing production chains, as inputs suppliers and
agricultural processors went bankrupt. Finally, specialized NGOs express concerns with respect
to the environment, animal welfare and labor standards and ask for the relevant externalities to be
internalized in some way through taxes, quantity constraints, or tradable property rights.
Clearly, theoreticians were not represented in Seattle but they have been concerned with
trade liberalization as well and prepared the ground for much of the current debate. Interestingly,
perfect competition only plays a modest role in the modern theory of international trade and
imperfect competition takes a far more prominent position. This literature suggests that trade
                                                
1 Although no official name has been agreed upon to date for the new round of trade negotiations, it is
commonly referred to as the Millennium Round.
2liberalization may lead to further concentration and that tariffs may serve to tax monopoly profits.
It also highlights the inbuilt conflict between the multilateralism of the WTO process and the
current trend towards regionalism. For example, the EU is preparing for accession of new
members from Central and Eastern Europe and has by means of its Agenda 2000 initiated various
changes, including a reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EU is also engaged in
organizing its future development cooperation according to regional groupings (REPAs) with
whom it seeks to conclude agreements on aid and trade. Similarly, Mercosur, NAFTA and APEC
have been strengthening their position.
Governments react selectively to the various issues and currently take very different
positions. The USA called for elimination of export subsidies by the EU and Japan, and opposed
the labeling requirements on food imposed by imports on genetically modified organisms in food
by these countries. Other agricultural exporters also asked for elimination of export subsidies.
The USA proposed to place the issue of labor standards on the agenda. The EU and Japan took a
different position and asked on their part for a review of the anti-dumping practices, a faster
liberalization of trade in textiles, a demand supported by many developing countries. In addition,
several countries tried to table environmental issues and insisted that the various environmental
and recreational services rendered by agriculture should be rewarded separately (multi-
functionality). Regarding services, East Asian governments insist on mitigating speculative flows
of international capital in the future and want to keep the domestic banking sector under tight
government control. Developing countries generally want to reopen the discussions on many
matters that were settled during the Uruguay Round, such as an elaboration of their Special and
Differential treatment and the agreement on intellectual property rights. OECD countries on their
part would like to proceed further on these subjects but after taking note of the position of
developing countries, they became more hesitant. Therefore, it was hardly a surprise when it
proved impossible to agree on the agenda at the end of the three-day conference in Seattle. The
WTO continues to function as an organization and the agenda is being prepared through
diplomatic channels. Indeed it appears that to avoid protracted negotiations during the round,
participants have decided to “frontload” all difficulties within the discussion on the agenda,
which thus became a vital part of the negotiating process itself. But the disagreement in Seattle
clearly illustrates that this approach may be very ambitious.
At a more abstract level, one may notice that the Millennium Round sees itself confronted
with a wide range of reasonably well defined issues, summarized by keywords such as food
safety, intellectual property rights, international competition, access to courts, or environmental
sustainability. Every issue has its own stakeholders in civil society world wide but most were
formulated in the North. Consequently, developing countries often find it difficult to assess the
scope and strength of the various concepts and to decide which coalition to join.
The aim of the present paper is to review these issues and concepts against the background of the
current implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements and to consider their current
implications for developing countries. Special reference will be made to the Agreement on
Agriculture as viewed from the perspective of a least developed country (LDC) in Africa, with
Ethiopia as a case study. Like in most other LDCs, agriculture is Ethiopia’s major sector and the
formal sector is small. Land resources are scarce, population is growing fast, malnutrition is
widespread, and the country has a history of receiving considerable amounts of food aid. Export
revenues depend heavily on few, generally agricultural, commodities. Less typical for an African
LDC is that its mining sector is insignificant, and that tropical diseases such as malaria are less
prevalent due to the cooler climate of the highlands. Ethiopia also has more than its share of
dramatic events. After a civil war that only ended in 1992, a war started with Eritrea in 1999 and
3droughts in three successive years have now caused serious food shortages for about 8 million
people.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the Uruguay Round
Agreements, with special attention to the Agreement on Agriculture, and assesses the effects on
developing countries. In chapters 3 and 4 we focus on the implications for Ethiopia in terms of
economic strategies in general, and selected commodities. Next, important topics for the new
Millennium Round are considered. Chapter 5 discusses in general terms a possible elaboration of
the special treatment as well as improvements in market access, especially to the EU, and
extensions of the dispute settlement procedures. Chapter 6 reviews more recent developments,
including the trend towards regionalism and the ‘new economy’ issues, which might play a role
in the negotiations on agriculture. Chapter 7 evaluates the relevance of these topics for Ethiopia
and other least developed countries, partly relying on views expressed by Ethiopian
representatives, and concludes.
4
5Chapter 2
The Uruguay Round Agreements
2.1 GATT/WTO: the international institution
For many years, the rules for international trade were laid down in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, first signed in 1947. The treaty rests on two basic rules, the most-favored-
nation (MFN) rule, which specifies that a concession granted to a member state must be extended
to all of them, and the national treatment rule which forbids any preferential treatment of
domestic over foreign goods after import tariffs have been paid. This is basically a non-
discrimination principle that only accepts tariffs as instrument to govern trade flows.
Furthermore, these tariffs should not prohibit trade altogether. The series of multilateral rounds of
trade negotiations is a sustained attempt to impose these disciplines more rigorously, and for an
increasing number of goods. During the first rounds, the main issue was to achieve a reduction of
the rather substantial tariff rates, and for manufacturing products they were relatively successful
in this respect.
The latest round, culminating in the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1994, managed to
include agriculture and services into the package. It also achieved full ‘tariffication’ of all border
measures. Through it, the proliferation of new protectionist instruments such as ‘voluntary’
export restraints, non-automatic licensing procedures and the arbitrary use of standards as
protective measures, that enabled members to navigate through the mazes of the GATT, was
stopped, in principle. However, the practical implementation proves difficult. Another innovation
of the Uruguay Round Agreements was the establishment of the World Trade Organization,
WTO, as the organization that governs international trade, overseeing virtually every aspect of
world commerce, with a dispute settlement system to ensure adequate redress for bilateral trade
problems. The Agreement establishing the WTO creates a single institutional framework
encompassing both the GATT as modified by the Uruguay Round, and all other agreements and
arrangements concluded during this Round. A ‘single undertaking approach’ is adopted, implying
that membership of WTO entails full acceptance by members of all results of the Round, such as
GATT 19942, GATS (on services) and TRIPS (on intellectual property). The WTO is considered
important for developing countries because it defines their rights as well as enforcement
procedures. At the same time, membership to the WTO comes with obligations: it imposes
disciplines how to regulate trade and how to report on it, although during a transitional period
countries have the option to apply for waivers.
The set of rules currently ascertaining the orderly conduct of trade (product definition,
custom classification, setting of standards, enforcement rules, and so on) and the safeguards and
exemptions is vast. There is an extensive literature on the history of the Uruguay Round as well
as the economic and legal aspects of the GATT (see Staiger, 1995; Josling, Tangermann and
Warley, 1996; Anderson, 1996; Jackson, 1997, Croome, 1999). Hence, our discussion3 of the
                                                
2 Although strictly speaking ‘GATT 1994’ is only one of the Uruguay Round Agreements, we refer to all the
rules in these agreements as GATT or WTO rules.
3 This chapter builds upon background report Merbis and Tims (1997).
6content and scope of the WTO will be brief and focused on the Agreement on Agriculture as part
of GATT 1994 and its relevance to developing countries.
2.2 The Agreement on Agriculture
The Uruguay Round was the first to treat agriculture as an integral part of world trade. From the
onset agricultural exporters had disagreed strongly on the objectives of the Round, and the failure
to reach a solution delayed its conclusion by some three years. Admittedly, the aim  ‘to establish
a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’ (GATT, 1994, p. 39) was far-reaching. In
1986, at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, import restrictions used to be common practice in
agricultural trade, and their use had proliferated over time by way of quotas, voluntary export
restrictions, minimum import price systems and the like. Several countries also used
phytosanitary measures as non-tariff barriers to imports.  In addition, both in developed and in
developing countries a substantial part of the tariffs was not bound by any earlier multilateral
agreement (i.e. had no ceiling). But market distortions were not only prevalent on the import side.
Various mechanisms were in place that effectively support producers and subsidize exports.
In fact, as of fall 1999, practically all these distortions persist. The main contribution of the
Agreement on Agriculture has been not so much to reduce protection as to make protection more
transparent and measurable, and to ensure that it cannot increase. This was achieved through
provisions pertaining to market access, domestic support, and export competition.
Market access
Improvement in market access was presumably the main advance of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Instruments were requirements on tariffication, notification of upper bounds on
tariffs, and, most importantly, the provision that these bounds cannot be raised in nominal terms.4
However, in many countries, especially the developed ones, the bounds could be set sufficiently
high as to remain prohibitive, and, until a new agreement rules differently, international inflation
would be the only mechanism to reduce them in real terms. Developing countries were hardly
involved in this part of the negotiations, which in their view were dominated by the developed
part of the world. They basically took the position that developed countries were free to agree to
all the disciplines they liked, as long as developing countries were not bound by them. Indeed,
through the Special and Differential Treatment, developing countries can so far escape most of
the disciplines of the deal (Hoekman, 1995). Let us briefly review the main elements of the
agreement.
i. Tariffication: the principle of tariffication is the key element of the agreement. Parties are held
to convert non-tariff barriers (NTBs) into tariffs, and the level of protection is supposed to be
expressed in a tariff that is equivalent to the protection level prevailing in the base period 1986-
‘88. Renewing or re-introducing other barriers than tariffs is not permitted. In the past member
states often invoked tariffs at their discretion, but now all member states are obliged to deliver the
ceilings (‘bounds’) of the tariffs allowed, in their Schedule of Concessions.
                                                
4 It is at the importer’s discretion to specify the tariff as ad valorem or as specific duty, which can then either be
in a foreign currency, for example, US dollars or euro (as in the case of Poland), or in the domestic currency.
Developing countries can thus circumvent the impact of high inflation by stating their Schedules in a foreign
currency.
7ii. Tariff reduction: after tariffication, reduction of tariff levels should take place. Developed
countries must reduce them by 36  per cent over six years, developing countries by 24 per cent
over ten years. The least developed countries are exempted from any reduction. The  percentage
reduction is an average over all tariff lines and to avoid that reductions are only imposed on
products with insignificant trade flows and high tariffs, every tariff line must be reduced by 10
per cent at least (15 per cent for developed countries).
iii. Safeguards: several provisions in the agreement must prevent that a country is flooded by
cheap imports. A safety trigger measure must be applied to determine when the safeguard can be
activated. The trigger measure can be expressed as a percentage of the total imports allowed, or
as a minimum 1986-‘88 base-period price below which imports may be charged by a levy.
Safeguard duties are only allowed until the year’s end and the mechanism only applies to tariffied
products.
iv. Minimum access: countries must open their domestic markets at low levels of import duties up
to minimum access commitments, specified as a share of the domestic market (rising from 3 to 5
per cent). These import quota face a preferential tariff up to commitments and are referred to as
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs).
Furthermore, in parallel with the Agreement on Agriculture, two separate agreements were
concluded that deal with technical restrictions on market access. While the Agreement on
Technical Barriers covers general aspects, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
measures (GATT 1994, pp. 69-84) addresses specific aspects of food safety and animal health. Its
measures aim to limit the damage within the territory of a member from the entry and
establishment of pests and to protect:
- animal or plant life or health within the territory of a member, or to halt disease and pests,
- human or animal life or plant life from risks arising from toxins, disease-carrying organisms in
food, beverages and foodstuffs, and additives,
- animal or human life from the spread of animal- or plant-transported diseases or pests.
Domestic support
With respect to domestic support, the main provision of the Agreement on Agriculture has been
to specify a method to bring all support under the common monetary denominator, the Aggregate
Measurement of Support, AMS, classified by color, amber, blue, and green.
i. The AMS includes expenditures on domestic subsidies as well as market price support policies
such as administered prices. It is calculated by summation over all commodities and programmes,
but excludes instruments that have minimal effects on production and trade. Examples of such so-
called ‘Green Box’ instruments are general support to the agricultural sector, or policies that are
‘de-coupled’ from production. They are summarized in Text box 1.  Developing countries receive
additional exemptions beyond the ones in the Green Box, e.g. for government support
programmes to foster agricultural and rural development, agricultural input subsidies generally
available to low-income or resource-poor farmers, investment subsidies and subsidies to
eliminate illicit crops (narcotic drug crops). Developed countries also managed to exempt certain
policies that were subsequently collected in the so-called Blue Box. Policies that have a
production-limiting effect qualify as such. This compromise allowed the EU to legalize its
hectare and headage premiums introduced in the 1992-reform which evolved as the major
8instrument of the CAP to support agriculture. The AMS is only calculated over the remaining
(Amber box) policies.
ii. Reduction of the AMS: the developing countries are required to reduce the AMS to 86.7 per
cent of its 1986-‘88 base-period level in ten years (to 80 per cent in six years for developed
countries). LDCs do not have to reduce their AMS, but should not increase it either.
iii. De minimis levels of support: developing countries may exclude product-specific government
support from the calculation of the AMS that does not exceed ten percent of the production value
for any crop. In addition, general support (not specific to any commodity) that does not exceed
ten percent of their total agricultural production value is also excluded. For developed countries
the de minimis level is only five.
Export competition
i. Reduction of export subsidies: developed countries have subsidized their agricultural exports
extensively, depressing prices on some of the most important agricultural world markets and
severely disturbing local markets (Ritson and Harvey, 1997). The Agreement contains relatively
solid provisions to reduce these subsidies. It bans the introduction of any new export subsidies.
Developed countries are required to reduce their subsidized exports by 24 per cent in volume and
by 36 per cent in value for each product over six years starting from a 1986-‘90 base. For
developing countries the percentages are 14 per cent in volume and by 24 per cent in value for
each product over 10 years from the same base. Least developed countries are exempted from the
reduction commitments on export subsidies. Subsidies on marketing costs and specific domestic
transport costs are allowed to developing countries in order to compensate for poor infrastructure.
Text box 1 Summary of Green Box Policies
The Legal Texts sum up the green box policies in great detail.
General characteristics of measures of government support to qualify for green box membership: transfers
from government, not consumers, and no price support to producers of agricultural products. Such measures
must have no, or minimal, effects on production or trade.
1. General policies (Research & Development, pest and disease control measures, training, extension and
advisory measures, inspection services, marketing and promotion services, infrastructural services)
2. Public stockholding for food security purposes
3. Domestic food aid
4. Direct payments to producers conforming to the two criteria mentioned above
5. De-coupled income support
6. Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programmes
7. Payments for relief from natural disasters
8. Structural adjustments through total production retirement programmes
9. Structural adjustment assistance through investment aids
10. Payments under environmental programmes
11. Payments under regional assistance programmes
Source: GATT, 1994, pp. 56-62
9Implementation of the commitments
The specific commitments made by the various countries are laid down in the Schedules of
Concessions, which every member has submitted to the WTO. In this way all the commitments
(tariff rates, other duties, safeguard provisions, market access) could be spelled out by tariff lines.
However, it turns out that the commitments are sometimes at odds with the Agreement itself, and
yet it is virtually impossible to challenge these concessions, which are the result of a long process
of bid-and-offer. Article 13 (called ‘Due restraint’, but mostly referred to as the Peace Clause) of
the Agreement explicitly specifies that domestic support measures and export subsidies that
conform fully to the provisions in the various schedules, are not to be challenged nor to be
subjected to countervailing measures.5 In case of agriculture, the peace clause limits this
possibility for the first 9 years, after which the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) might be
used to settle inconsistencies.
2.3 Implications of specific regulations for developing countries
The tariffication of non-tariff barriers and the ban on the future use of such measures amounts to
a considerable improvement in agricultural trading practices, and the binding of tariffs makes it
more difficult to raise tariff levels in a discretionary manner. Import tariffs below prohibitive
levels are less restrictive than quantity restrictions since they in principle enable the exporter to
sell freely at the prevailing world price (but notice that many EU tariffs for agricultural products
still isolate the domestic EU price from the world price). Future negotiations can now start with
discussions on reductions of tariff rates. The Agreement on Agriculture defined a framework
whose implementation is still incomplete and bears the mark of the compromises needed to
conclude the deal. We mention the following.
Tariffication. There are some indications that the newly bound tariffs were inflated and often set
at prohibitive levels and ceilings of over 200 per cent were recorded (Valdés and McCalla, 1996,
table 1). A possible reason could be that developing countries were in practice allowed to bypass
the tariffication process and just deliver their tariff ceilings. Also, the possibility to spread the
reduction in tariff rates unevenly among tariff lines, appears to maintain considerable protection
for sensitive products, and although the phenomenon of tariff escalation (i.e. tariff rates increase
with the level of processing) has been contained, it has not been eliminated.
Access. In the part of the agreement that regulates access, the contracting parties are required to
grant a low tariff for an import volume up to a small fraction of domestic production. The tariff
quotas are to be allocated on MFN-basis. However, since only a small number of exporting
countries is able to fill them, the principle of non-discrimination will often be violated. In fact,
several countries, notably the EU, have implemented the market access commitments as part of
their preferential import schemes, for example for the sugar that ACP countries may export duty-
free to the EU under the Lomé convention. In this way, the principle of non-discrimination has
been abandoned from the outset.
                                                
5 Green Box policies are not actionable for GATT retaliatory measures; domestic and export subsidies that are
subject to the reduction commitments may be challenged only if they cause injury. The article on Market Access
explicitly rules out, among others, the use of quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies and
discretionary import licensing.
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Domestic policy reform. Developed countries have gradually come to recognize that domestic
subsidies distort trade, and that farm support, if any, should be given in the least trade-distorting
way. This would imply that price support should vanish eventually and that support should be
given as income transfer to farmers who need it, or as regional and infrastructural programmes.
The agreement goes at great length in defining subsidies but this could not avoid disputes as to
which policies fall in the Green Box, and how high ‘excessive rates of inflation’ should be to lift
AMS commitments (Konandreas and Greenfield, 1996). The exemptions for developing
countries, the least developed ones in particular, leave sufficient options to support agriculture,
even when the base-year AMS is very low as is often the case for such countries. Developing
countries should also be aware of the possibility of notifying commitments in a foreign currency,
such as the US dollar or the euro. Since the currencies of most developing countries tend to
devaluate faster than these foreign currencies, they will be able to make maximal use of their
AMS room by notifying in a stable foreign currency. Be this as it may, providing decoupled
income support to farmers always is a costly proposition. Developing countries find it especially
difficult to mobilize the necessary resources, and also generally lack the administrative capacity
for adequately targeting this support.
Export subsidy reform. Since the export subsidies are specified in explicit schedules over the
implementation period, this part of the provisions is relatively watertight but the schedules still
leave room for targeted export subsidies for sales to specific regions. Here also developing
countries with high inflation will see their export commitments vanish quickly when stated in
their domestic currency, and it became common practice to use a foreign currency.
Standards. According to Uruguay Round Agreements, it is legal to restrict imports so as to meet
standards, say, regarding the safety of imported meat, but the restriction should not be excessive
and be justified on a scientific basis. Clearly, standards restrict trade among developed countries,
witness the ban of the EU on beef treated with hormones and genetically modified maize from the
USA. They also restrict imports from developing countries, since these are rarely in a position to
prove that they meet all phytosanitary requirements.
Safeguards. Countries may invoke safeguards to protect domestic industries in case of material
injury inflicted upon them by imports ‘at less than normal value’, but such anti-dumping
regulations have been made more transparent (see Text box 2). This makes it more difficult to
restrict imports to keep balance of payments equilibrium and to protect an infant industry.
Dispute Settlement. The new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), also known as Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (DSM), is seen as one of the major results of the Uruguay Round
(Croome, 1999). WTO members now have access to a unified dispute settlement procedure,
covering all multilateral agreements. As a departure from the former GATT regulation, members
now have a virtually automatic right to request a panel and the adoption of the panel report is
almost automatic as well, except if all parties agree to reject it. Previously, one contracting party
of the GATT could already block acceptance of the report (see Hudec, 1993). The DSU specifies
strict disciplines and time limits for each stage of the process (GATT, 1994, pp. 404-433). There
is a possibility for appeal to the standing Appellate Body which can scrutinize the legal aspects of
the panel report (see Palmeter and Mavroidis, 1999).  In  short, the DSU was  seen as a major step
11
towards a more ‘rule-based’ instead of ‘power-based’ organization, that can provide more legal
security for developing countries (Whalley, 1996). Observers feel that by and large the dispute
settlement mechanism lived up to the expectations (Jackson, 1997, IATRC, 1997, Behboodi,
1998, Hudec, 1998). Most of the disputes for which a case was filed could be resolved
satisfactorily, although in the cases of the USA against the EU on bananas and on beef treated
with hormones no solution was reached so far, and recently the US have imposed retaliatory
tariffs (see WTO, 1999). The number of cases has tripled on a per annum basis, and developing
countries participate more actively (see Table 1), both as complainant and as respondent.
Table 1.   Participation in WTO dispute settlement cases (April 1994-March 1999)
Complainant No. disputes Respondent No. disputes
US, EU, Japan and Canada 118 US, EU, Japan and Canada 90
Other OECD 22 Other OECD 27
Developing/Transition countries 43 Developing/Transition countries 47
Least developed countries 0 Least developed countries 0
Source: Horn and Mavroidis, 1999
Text box 2 The Agreement on Anti-Dumping
The Agreement on Anti-dumping proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks for completing the
Uruguay Round (GATT, 1994, pp. 168-196). This agreement is a revision and an expansion of
GATT Article VI that allows members to take countervailing measures when exports are sold at less
than ‘normal’ value. The instrument became popular partly because of its loose definition of the way
to compute this normal value and the dumping margin (the amount by which the normal value of the
goods exceeds the export price thereof). Its provision that anti-dumping (AD) measures can be
applied discriminatorily and without reciprocity was also considered expedient. The new Agreement
on Anti-Dumping tries to redress these defects. It specifies more notification requirements before
action can be taken, it defines a sunset clause (the AD measure can last only for five years, but there
is scope for renewal), and it introduces stricter definitions for dumping and for computation of
dumping margins. Yet the approach and concepts have not changed (Finger (1995) and Bronckers
(1995)) and anti-dumping measures have not disappeared (Miranda, Torres and Ruiz, 1998).
Moreover, as long as the anti-dumping instrument persists, countries can effectively threaten
competitors without taking any visible action.
The EU essentially copied the WTO agreement when it revised its own AD legislation (AD
enforcement is based on national AD laws and regulations). The European Commission even asserts
that the EU regulation is an improvement compared to the WTO Agreement. It is clearer and has
tighter rules, as well as jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice. The regulation also
introduced the notion of Community interest that provides the anti-dumping authorities with some
discretionary power to deny or modify anti-dumping relief. Tighter rules may have been a reason
that developed countries use AD-measures less than before but developing countries have
apparently discovered the use of AD measures as well, see Figure 1.
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Developing countries were relatively successful, even against developed countries (viz.
Costa Rica vs. US in the case on cotton textiles, and Venezuela vs. US on gasoline standards, see
WTO, 1999). In these cases, the US chose to comply after the issuance of the Appellate Body
report, and changed its policy (Behboodi, 1998). For developing countries this is a new and
encouraging development, since it indicates that, despite their limited bargaining power, they can
now protect their interests by the rule of law. However, the sanctions are still limited to
authorized retaliation. Larger countries may not always be willing to give in under that pressure,
despite the negative reputation effects. If non-compliance becomes frequent, the DSU loses its
credibility.
To sum up, the Agreement on Agriculture is a major step towards a rule-based system
(Jackson, 1997), as only tariffs are left as means to effectuate border protection, and disputes can
be settled through detailed procedures. Nonetheless, developing countries did not gain much
access through this agreement, and some of them actually lost some of their preferential
treatment. Despite pledges to consider carefully the negative effects for LDCs (GATT, 1994, pp.
448-449), no explicit rules for financial compensation have been worked out. For developing
countries the benefits are only realized in the medium and long term, through more transparent
trading rules, a better operation of the world market, and better market access.
2.4 Reasons for joining WTO
The WTO currently counts 135 members already, and 31, mostly developing countries, have
applied for membership. In view of the limitations mentioned above, one may ask why
membership is so attractive to them. Three reasons can be mentioned.
First, countries may wish to join the WTO to gain access to either MFN-status or
preferences. WTO members have guaranteed MFN-treatment, and new tariff reductions are on
the agenda with the prospect of better trade opportunities. For non-members and large exporters,
such as China, MFN-treatment is crucial, especially to achieve MFN-status from the USA.
Clearly, LDCs often profit much more from preferential trading schemes, which usually go far
beyond MFN-status (the Lomé convention provides duty free access for a large majority of ACP
exports, see Stevens et al., 1998). However, for the sensitive products these advantages are
constrained in volume and, in a new round, persistent erosion of preferences is to be expected as
tariffs are reduced and NTBs removed. Reciprocity might again become the dominant principle.
Second, the legal protection offered by the Dispute Settlement Understanding promises to
improve LDCs’ position in world trade. The DSU remains a cumbersome procedure for small
players in world trade as long as the main trading parties (EU, Japan, USA) adopt national
legislation not necessarily in conformity with the WTO agreements. LDCs feel especially
disadvantaged since they lack the means to fight legal battles, have informational disadvantages
and less bargaining power than the world powers. Nonetheless, in some cases developing
countries have won disputes against developed countries, although Sub-Saharan countries have
not been involved in disputes thus far.
Finally, joining the WTO offers specific privileges with respect to institutional support. The
WTO can only ensure the fair and adequate implementation of the new trading system when the
underlying procedures are clearly motivated, transparent, accessible to other parties, and readily
enforceable. This implies that member states must fulfil an extensive set of monitoring and
notification requirements, and undergo a trade policy review frequently. LDCs can only comply
with these requirements if they have received extensive technical support and training, and the
Geneva-based International Trade Centre and the Integrated Framework for trade-related
technical assistance, adopted at the Singapore Ministerial Conference, were set up to this effect
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(see South Centre, 1999b). However, membership of WTO is not always required for such
support, and other international organizations such as FAO provide similar assistance.6
Obviously, there are also reasons not to join. Despite all provisions for a Special and
Differential treatment, the WTO disciplines are meant to promote international competition, and
loss of protection may cause closure of domestic firms, unemployment and social distress.
Countries aspiring to become WTO member have to negotiate on all the preferential provisions
that exist for developing or least-developed countries on a case-by-case basis. The bound tariffs
listed in their Schedules must be commercially viable and are not allowed to exceed the applied
rates in a significant way. 7 At the same time, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, developing
countries often have undergone the necessary reform already, as part of the structural adjustment
programs, and the LDCs are often all too willing to reform as they have little to lose.
Furthermore, the LDCs largely rely on the agricultural sector, which was in the past being taxed
rather than being supported and for whom trade liberalization consequently leads to an
improvement in terms of trade. 
2.5 Evaluation of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Ex ante assessments
When the Uruguay Round reached a deadlock - at the time the solution proposed by the chief
negotiators was taking shape but still had to gain the support from the negotiating parties - a
whole series of studies appeared that were based on model simulations. These studies,
summarized in Martin and Winters (1995) and OECD (1998a), reported substantial welfare gains
from partial liberalization ranging between 50 and 250 billion US$. The differences in model
specifications explain this wide range. Static gains under the perfect competition assumption are
much lower than those achieved under increasing returns to scale, product differentiation or
dynamic assessments. Increasing returns create welfare gains as markets become larger. Under
product differentiation trade widens the scope of brands available to the consumer. And dynamic
assessments make it possible to account for cumulated effects. The studies argued that a failure of
the Round would mean giving up potential welfare gains for all regions, except Sub-Saharan
Africa which would see its trade preferences erode. The results were invoked to convince the
GATT members, and to include provisions to compensate the losers, which however never
materialized into any additional financial flows to LDCs.
                                                
6 FAO provides its member states with technical assistance on a wide range of trade and WTO related issues. 
Assistances include analysis of impact of specific trade and production policies in relation to the Uruguay
Round Agreements, analytical methodologies for determining the impact of the Uruguay Round Multilateral
Negotiations, preparing positions for WTO membership and fulfilling obligations, adoption of Codex
Alimentarius standards, food safety and standards, strengthening national food control systems, forestry and
fishery issues relevant to WTO as well as intellectual property rights in respect of plant varieties, animal breeds,
related knowledges and germ plasm (see website http://www.fao.org/ur/). FAO is currently organizing a
worldwide training programme covering fourteen regional workshops in Africa, Asia, Near East, Europe and
Latin America aimed at enhancing national capacity on WTO issues so that countries are in a stronger position
to meet their obligations and accrue the benefits under the existing WTO Agreements and are better prepared to
participate in future negotiations and agenda setting. All developing and “transition” countries will participate in
the training irrespective of their status with respect to WTO. For details see website
(http://www.fao.org/ur/umbrella.htm).
7 The authors thank Mr. Thomas Friedheim of the WTO for useful communications on this point.
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Ex post assessments
In view of these optimistic ex ante  assessments, one might expect an elaborate series of ex post
assessments as well. A positive evaluation would strengthen the credibility of the studies
conducted. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task because it is hard to disentangle the GATT
effect from other factors, such as weather conditions (El Niño), civil  unrest, deviant domestic
policies, technological change, and business cycles, whose effect could dominate the trade effect
by far. An ex post assessment has to control for such factors.
In fact, no studies could be found on the subject, let alone that any independent audit was
organized to assert the ex post validity of earlier claims. Several reasons might be envisaged. One
is that there are technical reasons related to the update of model specifications and databases. The
Uruguay Round Agreements introduced tariffication and while the recording of bound tariffs and
NTBs has improved significantly, trade statistics are seldom sufficiently differentiated to reflect
the distribution of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) which countries introduced to guarantee minimum
import access. The quotas can be allocated in different ways to exporters (traditional shares, first
come first serve, auctioning, proportionate, and several more). In practice, the regulation of this
trade instrument has grown into an administrative nightmare, since the WTO left this issue open
(Josling, 1997).
A second set of reasons relates to the changing environment, characterized by volatile
world market prices. This aspect is of special concern for developing countries. As little effective
liberalization of agricultural markets took place under the Agreement on Agriculture, this
agreement could not be expected to have a major impact on world markets. Almost all ex ante
exercises only predicted minor increases in most world market prices, combined with small price
decreases for commodities undergoing little liberalization, like oilseeds and tropical beverages.
For example, the RUNS model found a price impact in the range of –1 to +4 per cent (Goldin and
van der Mensbrugghe, 1995), and the FAO World Model found price increases up to 10 per cent,
with cereals and oilseeds in the 4-7 per cent range (FAO, 1995c). It was also argued liberalization
would make world market prices less volatile.
With hindsight, even this modest prediction proved too optimistic, as agricultural
liberalization was even less than anticipated (Tangermann, 1996), and markets stayed segmented
as before. Under these conditions, important climatic shocks, government policies that reduced
the level of public stocks, combined with crises in South East Asia, Russia and Brazil inserted a
large amount of volatility into most commodity markets. Of course, volatility is not a new
phenomenon. It has since the seventies plagued developing countries at various occasions (see
Figure 2).
Figure 2 illustrates the dominance in the late nineties of swings in commodity prices. The
boom in cereals price in 1995/96 was short lived (US Hard Winter wheat prices reached a record
level of 263 US$/t in May 1996) and 1996 ending prices were back to ‘normal’ levels, close to
the 140-160 US$ range of the early nineties. At that point in time, most commodity forecasts
expected a gradual recovery of prices boosted by strong demand from the emerging economies
(cf. OECD figures in Table 2), which did not materialize as prices fell even deeper (see FAO data
in Table 2). In 1998 cereal prices began to slide and as of September 1999, Hard Winter wheat
stood at 115 US$/t and the future prices of wheat at the Chicago Board of Trade for December
delivery even 10 US$ lower.8
                                                
8 A similar picture emerges for coarse grains (as of September 1999 the level for maize dropped to 70 US$/t),
and for oilseeds, see Table 2. Thai white rice, 100% second grade, fob Bangkok did 352 US$/t in 1996
(Jan/Dec), and 239 US$/t by September 1999, while sugar prices (ISA daily price) are now 5.7 cts/lb
(September 1999), which is half of the 1989/91 average.
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Table 2.   Commodity prices according to FAO and OECD, in US $ per ton
Wheat Coarse grains Oilseeds
FAO OECD FAO OECD FAO OECD
1992/’93
1993/’94
1994/’95
1995/’96
1996/’97
1997/’98
1998/’99
Sept 1999
1999/’00
2000/’01
2001/’02
2002/’03
143
143
157
216
181
142
120
115
144
140
154
209
184
162
163
  
169
171
175
181
  97
113
104
159
135
112
  95
  70
 
  97
112
109
169
121
120
118
124
127
129
132
220
254
221
273
299
262
203
163
247
270
262
304
304
252
239
240
245
256
269
FAO: Wheat is US no.2 Hard Winter, Coarse grains is US no. 2 Yellow Corn, delivered US Gulf ports, Oilseeds is US
yellow soybeans, delivered US Gulf ports.
OECD: Wheat is US no.2 Hard Winter, Coarse grains is US no. 2 Yellow Corn, Oilseeds is US soybeans, c.i.f. Rotterdam.
Sources: OECD (1998b). From 1997/’98 onwards the figures are model estimates. More recent projections incorporate the
price fall of 1998/’99. FAO Food Outlook, various issues (latest update: September 1999).
Common explanations are weak demand due to the crisis in Asia and Russia, weather
shocks (hurricanes, El Niño, flooding and droughts at various places), and a drop in transport
costs due to low oil prices. However, the sharp reduction of demand for feedgrains during the
Asia crisis suggests that there might also be a relatively new phenomenon at play. As emerging
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Figure 2.   World price indices
Note: MUV is the unit value index in US dollar terms of manufactures exported from the G-5 countries (France,
Germany, Japan, UK, and US).
Source: World Bank (1999c).
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economies reach income levels where meat consumption takes off sharply, a rationalization of
livestock production sets in. Traditional feeding systems, relying on high shares of by-products
and waste in total feed intake, are replaced, or at least supplemented, by modern systems which
depend on purchased feed (grains and grains substitutes from oilseeds and manioc). During the
transition period, demand for meat has a strong multiplier effect on demand for purchased feed. 9
In this light it is important for LDCs to maintain sufficient room for invoking safeguards
and keeping their bound tariffs at a level that enables them to raise import levies in situations with
extreme price volatility, when full price transmission would lead to unacceptable fluctuations in
food prices. Full price transmission could especially affect the landless poor whose capacity of
adjusting to price shocks is generally very limited.
Secular trends
Figure 2 also indicates that since the early eighties, agricultural commodities suffer a terms of
trade loss on the world market with respect to a non-agricultural price index. It would seem that
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis of the 1960s, refuted by Johnson (1967b) for the period until the
early sixties, deserves renewed attention (see also Cuddington, 1992; Sapsford and
Balasubramanyam, 1994; and Bloch and Sapsford, 1997 for recent attempts at rehabilitating this
hypothesis).
Classical arguments for prices of primary commodities to fall are that their consumer
demand is inelastic because of satiation, their supply inelastic because producers have fixed
inputs (land, their own labor, livestock herds) with little alternative use, and that technical
progress forces a secular downward trend in prices. In addition, the homogeneous nature of
primary products, and the large numbers of producers make it more difficult to capture any rents
through imperfect competition. Finally, the structural adjustment policies and the recent reduction
in official development aid have pushed up the exports from LDCs in volume terms, and this
tends to depress prices further.
The secular fall in prices is of special importance for LDCs, which mostly depend on
primary commodities for their export revenue. World wide various NGOs have sought to curb the
trend by creating channels for “fair trade”, see FLO (1999), through which farmers are assured of
a stable and relatively high price for their product. This can be viewed as a special form of
product labeling and vertical integration, to which we return in Chapter 6, but which cannot
reverse the underlying secular trend.
Ex-post evaluation of the Agreement
There is in the literature no comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the Agreement on
Agriculture, and for the reasons stated, it would also be difficult to arrive at objective
conclusions, due to the large number of confounding factors. Therefore, the assessment of the
implementation of the agreement has generally been of a descriptive nature. First, where actual
tariffs were below their bounds, the reduction of the tariff bounds as imposed by the Agreement
was not always accompanied by a reduction of actual tariffs. Second, the process of tariffication
did actually lead to higher tariff protection than the import restricting measures they were
                                                
9 The mechanism can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that feed demand is 100 units, out of which 80 are
supplied from traditional sources, and 20 are purchased, and that demand drops to 90 units. Since traditional
feeds largely consist of residuals, their supply remains more or less constant. Hence purchased feed demand 
becomes 10, i.e. is cut by half. In this case a 10 percent reduction in demand causes a 50 per cent cut in
purchased feed demand. And if demand  recovers to 100 units afterwards, this will imply a 100 per cent rise in
purchased feed demand.
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supposed to replace. This phenomenon is known as “dirty tariffication” and was widely
documented (see Ingco, 1995; Tangermann, 1996). Table 3 illustrates it for selected products.
Table 3.   Border protection for selected agricultural goods, in estimated tariff equivalent (per cent)
Wheat Sugar cane Meat
Pre-UR
actual
Post-UR
Bound
Pre-UR
Actual
Post-UR
Bound
Pre-UR
Actual
Post-UR
Bound
1986/88 1995 2000 1986/88 1995 2000 1986/88 1995 2000
European Union
United States
Japan
Brazil
Mexico
Other Latin America
Nigeriaa)
South Africa
Other Sub-Saharan Africaa)
Maghreb
Mediterranean
106
20
651
98
-1
-17
249
10
10
36
25
170
6
240
45
74
34
-
75
-
196
169
82
4
152
45
67
34
150
47
133
151
152
234
131
184
n.a.
-58
41
32
98
44
64
-13
297
197
126
55
173
85
-
124
-
220
107
152
91
58
35
156
80
150
105
100
165
93
96
3
87
-52
42
n.a.
n.a.
40
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
96
31
93
25
50
51
-
150
-
303
166
76
26
50
25
45
47
150
81
100
213
149
a) Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan countries were allowed to bind only in the final period.
Source: Ingco (1995)
The commitment to open markets by means of low tariff quotas (TRQs) up to five per cent
of domestic consumption also appeared to have negative side effects, as the GATT did not
specify how rights to import should be distributed among traders. Various practices have
developed and there currently is great uncertainty about the specific implementation and who gets
the rents. Duponcel (1998) finds some cases, in EU-EFTA trade, where rents accrue to exporters
and some where they accrue to importers but no systematic inquiry has been published so far.
Skully (1999) discovers that there exist seven legal ways of administering these TRQs.
The Uruguay Round Agreements made attempts to remove all NTBs and to replace them
by tariffs. Nonetheless, it allows for exemptions, to be notified to the WTO. Countries normally
are far from the WTO’s ideal of a completely flat tariff structure with ad valorem duties only.
Daly and Kuwahara (1998) report on the extent to which the EU, VS, Japan and Canada deviate
from this ideal, based on their nominally applied MFN rates. It appears that virtually all tariffs are
bound, and that the overall levels of tariff protection are low. After the Uruguay Round the
simple average of MFN rates is around 5.5 per cent. Yet,  many tariff ‘spikes’ remain, which  are
defined  in the  study as tariff rates above 15 per cent. In the EU the occurrence of tariff spikes
even increased after the Uruguay Round (from 5.7 to 9.2 per cent), while it roughly halved in the
other countries (see Table 1 of Daly and Kuwahara, 1998, for other measures as well). Tariff
escalation creates a further derogation from a flat tariff structure. In the US, Japan and Canada,
post-UR tariffs remain higher for finished goods than for raw materials (including agriculture). In
the EU, tariffs for finished goods are also higher than those for semi-finished goods. Tariffs on
raw materials are higher than on either finished or semi-finished goods, however, due to the CAP.
The authors also present indicators for non-tariffs barriers, shown in Table 4 for the EU but the
outcomes are similar for the US, Canada and Japan. The first indicator, the frequency ratio,
measures how many tariff lines are affected, the second, the import coverage ratio, attaches
weights to these lines. Both indicators show a steady decline of the use of NTBs.
18
Table  4.   Pervasiveness of different types of NTBs in the EU, percentage
Frequency ratio (F) Import coverage ratio (IC)
1988 1993 UR 1988 1993 UR
All NTBs 27.3 27.7 8.2 11.6 10.6 3.8
   Core NTBs 25.9 25.2 4.3 9.4 7.6 1.3
Quantitative restrictions (QRs) 20.4 20.1 1.7 6.5 6.2 0.8
  Export restraints 15.9 15.0 0.0 4.7 4.3 0.0
  Non-automatic licensing 5.1 5.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 0.7
  Other QRs 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Price control measures (PCMs) 13.2 10.6 3.2 4.9 3.0 0.6
   Variable charges 9.2 9.5 2.4 2.8 2.7 0.6
   AD/CVs 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.1
   Other PCMs 3.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0
Source: Daly and Kuwahara (1998)
Note: NTBs are non-tariff barriers, AD/CVs are anti-dumping/countervailing duty measures
The Uruguay Round Agreements and Africa
It has often been noted that Africa’s exports classified by main groups lean heavily on food and
agricultural raw materials (27 per cent of total), compared to 19 per cent  for manufactures
(excluding fuels), see Table 5. For the average of all LDCs, these shares are 15 and 54 per cent,
respectively.
Table 5.   Exports by main SITC group, 1990, in  percent
SITC group Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa
All foods
Agricultural materials
Fuels
Ores and metals
Manufactures
Chemicals
Other manufactures
Machinery and transport
Unallocated trade
63.3
25.1
  6.2
-
 5.3
 2.0
 3.2
 0.6
-
18.5
  8.3
36.3
16.6
18.8
  3.0
13.8
  2.0
  1.5
Source: Harrold (1995), Table 1.
Most of the products from Sub-Saharan Africa  (80 per cent) are exported to developed
(industrial) countries. For LDCs as a group this is 18 per cent. As shown in Table 6,  Europe is
the leading export destination. This is due to traditional ties, colonial links and the above-average
preference of the EU for Lomé countries.
Table 6.   Direction of Sub-Saharan Africa's exports, 1991, in percent
Exports to From: Ethiopia From: Sub-Saharan Africa
Europe
North America
Japan
Other industrial countries
Eastern Europe
Socialist Asia
Developing countries
40.3
11.2
14.9
  0.2
  4.8
  0.2
26.3
51.2
22.1
  5.6
  1.4
  0.9
  0.7
15.4
Source: Harrold (1995), Table 2.
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The EU imports almost all agricultural products from Africa free of duty, and for minerals
and metals the tariffs are very low. Thus, African products are nearly free of import tariffs. In
fact, the average tariff faced by the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa after the Uruguay Round
Agreements is found to be less than one per cent,  and with respect to the EU only 0.23 per cent 
(Table 3, Harrold (1995)). NTBs are more important: they affect 13 per cent  of the value of
SSA's exports to the OECD countries, but in case of Ethiopia it is found to be only 1.8 per cent, 
and 3.3 per cent  to the EU (Harrold (1995), Table 17).
Since the Uruguay Round Agreements focused on lowering trade barriers on an MFN
basis, the countries that enjoyed preferences found their preferential margins diminished. As the
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa receive extensive multiple tariff preferences in OECD markets
(under the Generalized System of Preferences or the Lomé Convention), the Uruguay Round
Agreements meant a loss to them.
2.6 Preparations for the new round
From Marrakech to Seattle: wrapping up and preparations.
During the Uruguay Round, the model-based calculation of welfare gains from tariffication and
tariff reductions proved effective in convincing the negotiating parties. The new round of trade
negotiations is also likely to be opened with a fresh cycle of calculations in the same spirit.10 And
to the extent that the models will be based on the same paradigm, substantial welfare gains will
be shown from trade liberalization, though occasionally some countries may incur losses.11 Yet
the argument is unlikely to carry as much weight as during the UR because MFN rates are now
lower, especially for manufactures and the remaining tariffs presumably relate to the more
sensitive and stubborn cases. There is also the lack of credibility since no proper ex post
assessment of the UR has been made. Finally, the scientific paradigm has shifted in many circles,
as economists have come to recognize the prevalence of market imperfections resulting from
imperfect competition, increasing returns, and non-rivalry. For example, whereas models that
assume fixed monopoly margins can sometimes be shown to yield welfare gains under trade
liberalization, this kind of result is much less probable if international cartels are given the
possibility to capture the rents freed by GATT rounds. We return to this aspect in Chapter 5
below.
Current preparations for the new round primarily seek to set the stage. WTO members
have communicated their initial positions by a notification to the WTO.12 The important occasion
is foreshadowed by an upsurge of publications with comments and suggestions for the coming
                                                
10 The World Bank is organizing an integrated program of research and capacity building to enhance the
participation of developing countries in the WTO 2000 negotiations in agriculture, see website
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbieb/trade/. The World Bank recently organized a kick-off meeting (Conference
on Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda from a development perspective: interest and options in the next
WTO negotiations, Geneva, October 1-2, 1999), where a number of quantitative and qualitative studies were
presented.
11 The new studies reiterate the earlier assertion of multilateral trade liberalization leading to substantial welfare
gains. For example, the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 1999) commissioned a study
based upon model exercises conducted with a static general equilibrium model as well as a dynamic
macroeconometric model. It concludes that the welfare gains from halving trade barriers are around US$400
billion annually. Eliminating barriers entirely would generate gains of around US$ 730 billion annually. These
are even presented as conservative estimates, though the ex-ante estimates of gains from the UR only reached
US$ 200 billion annually (OECD, 1998a).
12 The official positions are listed at http://www.wto.org/wto/minist/seatdocs.htm.
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round. Krueger (1999) argues that the developing countries have much to gain from an open
multilateral trading system and suggests holding a broad round with a wide sector coverage, and
with ample room for developing country interests. These might include pressing for full
implementation of the Uruguay Round, especially the part on the phasing out of the Multifiber
Agreement, keeping labor and environmental standards outside the GATT, and expanding the
GATS to include the possibility for construction workers to work abroad. This is very important
since it means that the sensitive topic of movement of natural persons enters the WTO
consultations (Srinivasan, 1999). Michalopoulos (1999) agrees that an active participation is
crucial for developing countries but points out that many of them, especially the smaller low
income countries do not have an adequate representation in Geneva and hardly participate in the
Organization’s activities. Regarding agriculture, Josling and Tangermann (1999) review the
implementation record of the main players and review the various opening bids for the new
round. They notice little enthusiasm for further talks on agriculture, and expect that these will
only start with a “feeling of resignation.” Blandford (1999) concurs with this view and outlines a
wide range of options for the position of US government, from protectionism to free trade. He
also expects further liberalization to be especially difficult this time since it will now affect
sectors such as dairy and sugar that are more heavily protected than those tackled during the
Uruguay Round and can mobilize more lobbying strength. The EU will strongly focus on
securing the Blue Box (Swinbank, 1999). It has little choice, as Agenda 2000, the most recent EU
reform (to be discussed in chapter 5), mainly dealt with internal CAP problems while meeting the
existing GATT export commitments, as opposed to anticipating the next WTO round.
Most authors concur on the present status of the traditional issues (market access,
domestic support, export subsidies). The UR has put the machinery in place but hardly achieved
any effective liberalization. Yet, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, opinions differ widely
among both academics and policy makers as to the next steps to take. The USA, Canada,
Australia and other CAIRNS group countries focus on trade liberalization in agriculture. As
agricultural exporters, they would like to see their market access improved and the tariffs of their
customers reduced, and seem to reject any non- Green Box policies. They also aim at maximal
reduction of trade-distorting domestic support, and seek elimination of all export subsides. The
EU on its part tries to safeguard its (Blue Box) income support to agriculture, preferably via the
existing methods of area and headage premiums, wants to see the multifunctional role of
agriculture recognized, and the Peace Clause renewed. Furthermore, the EU seeks recognition of
its non-trade concerns such as animal welfare, environmental standards, and labor standards.
These issues will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Japan aims at maintaining Blue Box
measures and market protection to maintain food security. It also stresses the multifunctionality
of its agriculture. Developing countries emphasize the special treatment enshrined in GATT law,
and try to preserve their preferences. They find the TRIPs agreement too strong, while the US
seek to strengthen it further but have become afraid of reopening the dossier. Finally, if in the
course of the round China accedes to the WTO, this will have an important impact. In China,
agricultural trade liberalization may not only lead to increased  imports of cereals, meat and dairy.
It might also create enormous exportable surpluses on markets for cash crops such as jute, sugar
and cotton. These could pose a serious threat to developing countries unless China commits to
strong restrictions on its subsidized exports.
All this obviously bypasses the main concerns of non-governmental organizations and
political movements who oppose the WTO process because they fear that, by promoting
standardization and conformity, it seriously threatens the cultural heritage and even the identity of
local communities, not to mention the ecology (see George, 1999, and IISD, 1999). We return to
these fundamental issues in the final chapters.
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Chapter 3
The Uruguay Round Agreements and agricultural development
in a least developed country:
 The case of Ethiopia
This chapter adopts the perspective of Ethiopia as a typical least developed country and discusses
how current WTO-regulations affect the overall development policies of the country. 13 The next
chapter enters into commodity-specific detail.
3.1 Current economic situation
Ethiopia belongs to the poorest countries in the world. Its per capita GNP of 110 US$ is the very
bottom, equal to that of the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo (World Bank, 1999b).
Ethiopia is the second most populated country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its fast growing population
of 60 million people has an average life expectancy at birth of only 43 years. Three-quarters or
more of the population have no access to safe water or sanitation, and almost two-thirds of the
adult population is illiterate (UNDP, 1999). Daily per capita  food supply is 1,860 Kcalories or 15
per cent  below the average for all Sub-Saharan Africa and far below estimated daily
requirements (FAO, 1999). Recent estimates suggest that more than half of the population is
permanently undernourished (FAO, 1998d). Nonetheless, the country has considerable potential
for growth. Agricultural productivity can be raised substantially through use of fertilizer and
improved seeds.
Of the 3.5 million hectares suitable for irrigation, only about five per cent  is irrigated
(FAO, 1995a). Ethiopian livestock herds are vast and count up to 30 million cattle, 22 million
sheep and 17 million goats, but the animals are in poor health and produce little. The soils harbor
a wide range of mineral deposits whose exploitation contributes only 0.3 per cent to GDP.
Finally, the installed hydropower capacity barely reaches one per cent  of the estimated potential.
Close to half of the country consists of highlands (see Figure 3), causing rainfall in Ethiopia
to be substantially higher than in surrounding, low-lying countries. The main rainy season
(‘Meher’) brings rain by southwesterly winds and lasts from July to September. A second, less
important rainy season (‘Belg’) brings rain from the southeast from February to April. Most of
the population lives in the highlands, where the climate is humid and cool, and thus free of
tropical diseases. Farms generally combine crop and livestock activities, with on average 1-2
hectare of cropland and a small number of livestock per farm. In the lowlands the climate is hot
and dry and nomadic livestock herding is the main farming system. In the northeastern parts of
the country, rainfall is less regular and soils have low fertility due to centuries of dense
cultivation. This area is particularly vulnerable to crop failures and famine.
Agriculture is the dominant economic sector, accounting for about half of GDP and for
more than four-fifths of employment and export earnings. Only 11 per cent  of the land is cropped
annually, but insufficient rainfall, unsuitable soils and the need to keep land for grazing limit area
expansion. About  40  percent  of  Ethiopia’s  territory  is  too  arid, as  shown in Table 7, whereas
                                                
13 This chapter is based on the background reports Kidane Mariam (1996),  Merbis et. al (1997a), Overbosch
(1996) and Wolde Mariam (1996).
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another 39 per cent has sufficient rains  but  soil  restrictions  make it only marginally suitable for
annual crops. The soils are either too steep, too stony, too shallow, too wet or have impermeable
layers14. Of course, part of the land with steep soils can be used for perennial crops, such as
coffee, tea or fruit trees, and other land might still be suitable for livestock grazing and browsing.
Just 11 per cent of the land has both sufficient rain as well as suitable soils for rainfed annual crop
cultivation, while the remaining 8 percent is only moderately suitable due to less severe soil
restrictions, which mainly refer to moderate slopes and bad drainage conditions, and can be
eliminated with appropriate land management. The areas most suitable for rainfed annual crop
cultivation are found in southern and western Ethiopia, as shown in Figure 4, which implies that
actually in large parts of the country rainfed arable agriculture is practiced on land that is only
marginally suitable for that purpose.
Table 7.   Land availability in Ethiopia for rainfed annual crop cultivation, in per cent
Unsuitable (too arid)
Marginally suitable
Moderately suitable
Suitable
40.6
39.0
8.4
11.0
Source: derived from FAO, 1998b
                                                
14 Land with a crop growing period of less than 75 days is considered too arid. Soils with a slope of more than
15 percent are considered too steep, soils with stones on more than 50 percent of the surface are considered too
stony, and soils with a depth of less than 25 cm are considered too shallow. Slopes of less than 8 percent and
stoniness of less than 15 percent of the surface are considered not to impose serious constraints on arable
agriculture.
Figure 3.    Ethiopia: Altitude (m) map.
 Source: FAO, 1998c.
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About 95 per cent  of cultivated land is farmed by small-holders who mainly produce for
subsistence needs, using low yielding traditional technology with hardly any improved seed and
very little fertilizer. The remainder five per cent  of the cultivated land is under large-scale state
farms. Land erosion poses a serious problem in several areas, due to deforestation and
overgrazing of communal lands (UNEP, 1992). The cropping pattern is diversified according to
differences in altitudes and temperature. Cereals are the major crops, occupying more than 60 per
cent  of the farmed land. Main cereals are maize, teff, sorghum, wheat and barley. Other
important food crops are oilseeds and pulses. Coffee is the main export crop, but it only occupies
3 per cent  of the cultivated land.
The industrial sector contributes about 11 per cent  to GDP and is largely engaged in the
processing of cereals, hides and skins, sugar and tobacco. It is mainly oriented to the domestic
market and state-owned enterprises account for about 70 per cent  of its total value added.
After a period of heavy state control over the economy, a policy of transition to the market
economy has been pursued since 1991. A gradual liberalization has taken place that allowed
economic growth to pick up from 1993 onwards (see Table 8). Agricultural output rose
significantly. The years 1995 and 1996 even produced bumper crops, that made the country
almost self-sufficient in food. This was the combined effect of good rains, improved availability
of inputs at lower prices, improved marketing opportunities as well as intensified extension
activities through demonstration plots. In addition, stronger competition in trade has reduced the
trade margins and made prices more favorable to farmers. However, agricultural production
remains vulnerable. Three successive failures of the ‘Belg’ rains have resulted in current food
shortages in several areas, affecting about 8 million people (FAO, 2000).
Regarding GDP measured in constant domestic prices, Table 8 reports considerable
growth, with an average of 7.5 per cent  from 1993 to 1996, but when measured in US dollars, the
level of GDP per capita has hardly risen, because of the persistent devaluation of the Birr, not
matched by the rise in the consumer price index. Indeed, if the exchange rate is corrected for
purchasing power parity, an economic growth per capita of 6.1 per cent  results. Nonetheless,
even in terms of purchasing  power, Ethiopia  is one  of  the poorest countries in the world. In the
Suitable
Suitable or mode-
rately suitable
Figure 4.   Ethiopia: area share of land suitable for rainfed arable agriculture
Source: FAO, 1998b
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Table 8.   Economic recovery and growth in Ethiopia in the 1990s
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Growth
‘92-‘96
Exports (million US$) 169.9 198.8 372.0 423.0 438.1 557.4 26.7
Cereal output (million tons)
Food availability (cal/cap/day)
5.3
1640
5.2
1694
6.7
1736
9.4
1881
9.5
1858
7.2 15.7
3.2
Growth rates (per cent)
- GDP
- value added Agriculture
- value added Manufacturing
- value added Services
-3.7
-2.7
-5.5
-4.8
12.0
6.1
36.1
16.0
1.6
-3.7
8.9
7.9
6.2
3.4
9.0
9.3
10.6
14.7
7.6
7.0
5.6
3.4
5.9
7.8
7.5
4.9
14.8
10.0
GNP per caput  ( USD) 110 120 110 110 110 110 0.0
GNP per caput, (1987 PPP $) 300 350 340 360 380 6.1
Consumer Price Index
(1990=100) 150 155 167 184 175 168 3.9
Exchange rate  (Birr / US$) 2.80 5.00 5.47 6.16 6.35 6.71 22.7
Sources :  IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook 1998 for exports;  FAO for cereal output and food availability ; World
Development Indicators CD-ROM 1998 and 1999  for GDP and GNP ; IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook
1998 for CPI and exchange rate
Note: Data for 1992 still include Eritrea
most recent World Development Report (World Bank, 1999a), the per capita GNP of Ethiopia is
500 PPP dollars of 1998 and only surpasses Tanzania (490) and Sierra Leone (390).
Since 1992 officially recorded exports returned to levels comparable to those recorded in
the 1980s (see Table 9). Ethiopia mainly exports agricultural commodities. Coffee, hides and
skins are sold to developed countries, especially the European Union. Its exports to Africa are
modest and largely directed to its direct neighbors. Imports have risen as well since 1992, and are
for a considerable share paid out of official transfers. Remarkable is the large contribution of
private transfers from Ethiopians abroad and non-governmental organizations. In recent years,
this item became higher than public transfers. Foreign earnings from services also are important
and are mainly attributable to Ethiopian Airlines. The table does not show any figures for direct
foreign investments, but according to IMF these are low, though growing in recent years (IMF,
1999). External debt has fluctuated around 70 per cent  of GDP since 1992, but almost doubled
when recently Ethiopia acknowledged debt to Russia inherited from the former Derg regime.
The growth experienced since 1992 can be attributed to a post-war recovery as well as
gains from trade liberalization. Further economic development will increasingly be hindered by
supply constraints, such as the poor educational and health status of the population, limited
production capacity, institutional constraints, and lack of infrastructure. Road density is very low,
the condition of the roads is often very poor, many rural areas are not linked to all weather roads,
and pack animals play a central role in transportation. The telephone network is largely
concentrated in Addis Ababa and does not function well. Consequently, domestic markets are not
well integrated, even for main commodities such as cereals. This reduces the farm prices in
surplus areas and discourages agricultural growth (RESAL, 1999).
However, while the beginnings of an economic recovery were seen in the nineties, this
period also witnessed a worsening of the relations with Eritrea. In July 1997, Eritrea introduced
own currency, ending its monetary union with Ethiopia. Next, a border dispute escalated in May
1998 with the Eritrean occupation of disputed territory. Trade with Eritrea came to a halt and
international  rade  flows  to  and  from  Ethiopia  were  diverted  from  Eritrean ports to Djibouti.
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Table 9.   Balance of payments of Ethiopia in recent years, in millions of U.S. Dollars
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99
Exports, f.o.b.
 - coffee
Imports, c.i.f.
Trade balance
Services
Income
Private transfers
Official transfers
Current account
Capital account
Overall balance
222
126
-1052
-829
73
-96
248
400
-204
160
-44
280
158
-915
-635
90
-79
247
285
-92
222
130
454
288
-1063
-609
121
-60
311
428
190
-62
128
410
273
-1413
-1003
139
-44
313
392
-203
166
-36
599
355
-1403
-804
133
-42
258
226
-230
29
-201
602
420
-1519
-917
139
-91
317
261
-292
-152
-444
494
279
-1509
-1015
92
-63
372
239
-374
-117
-492
Source : IMF, 1999
Figures for 1998/99 are preliminary estimates
These restrictions and the associated increased military spending endanger the already fragile
economic prospects of both countries. Although the shift to Djibouti does not appear to have
affected exports and imports yet, military spending has increased from 2 per cent of GDP in the
fiscal year 1997 to 6 per cent in 1999, partly at the expense of public investments. The
depreciation of the Birr has accelerated in 1999 and demand for new investment licenses has
slowed down, possibly as a reflection of concerns about the war (IMF, 1999).
3.2 General economic policies
Since the regime change in 1991, structural adjustment policies have redefined the role of
government, but the country has only partly succeeded in shaking off the legacy from its centrally
planned past. Until 1974 under the imperial government, modest economic development took
place with the establishment of commercial, large-scale farms and processing industries like meat
plants and tanneries, often as foreign direct investments. Exports were growing and diversifying
into cereals, oil crops, pulses, meat and meat products. During the military (Derg) regime from
1974 to 1991 the medium and large-scale enterprises were nationalized and trade was heavily
regulated, or monopolized by marketing corporations. Farmers were compulsorily organized in
cooperatives and agricultural support focused on state farms and the cooperatives. As a result,
economic growth slowed down and per capita agricultural production even dropped. Production
was increasingly for domestic demand, food exports declined and exports became concentrated in
coffee and hides and skins, as before. In its later years, the Derg regime took some small steps
towards a market economy, but a real transition started only after the change of government.
The new government that took control in May 1991 has initiated four major policy
changes. First, a program of democratization and regionalization of government was effectuated.
The country acquired a new constitution that specifies a federal structure with regional
governments ruling over newly defined regions. And Eritrea became independent in 1993.
Second, the transition to a market economy was initiated which led to redefinition of the
economic role of government, while many structural adjustment policies were implemented in
consultation with the IMF and the World Bank. Third, the overall development strategy of
‘Agricultural Development Led Industrialization’ designated the agricultural sector and its
farmers as the main engine of economic growth, to supply export commodities and raw material
for the processing industry. Fourth, it was decided to integrate Ethiopia into the global economy
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by progressively opening up the domestic economy to international competition. This strategy
was effectuated through the following policies.
Foreign Exchange Regime Liberalization. In October 1992 the Ethiopian Birr was devalued from
2.07 to 5 Birr per US dollar, and in May 1993 a fortnightly open auction of foreign exchange was
established, where government offered the valuta earned by exports to importers. Imports could
temporarily also be paid with ‘franco valuta’, which traders had obtained by private transfers or
otherwise. The easier access to foreign exchange at predictable rates is said to have re-routed
exports back into the official channels. In 1996, the frequency of the auctions was increased to
weekly, the export proceeds surrender requirement was eased and foreign currency bank deposits
were permitted. In September 1998 a further liberalization step included the start of retail trade in
foreign exchange by banks. Export proceeds surrender requirements were eliminated, and the
foreign exchange is now to be held at banks with a four week period for conversion or use for
imports, while 10 per cent  can be kept in foreign currency deposit accounts. Currently,
government intends to establish an inter-bank market for foreign exchange that will eventually
replace the official auctions. This step-wise liberalization of the foreign exchange regime since
1991 has considerably increased the incentives to export.
Domestic trade and transport deregulation. In December 1992 the fixed transport routing system
(‘Ketana system’) was abolished and private transportation was permitted with free route choice
and transport charges. The issuing of a large number of trade licenses has fostered trade though
the gains from this deregulation were diminished by the appearance of so-called ‘kella’ charges,
i.e. taxes on trade levied at checkpoints by local or regional governments, which also created
additional uncertainty and time delays in domestic trade. In recent years many of these
checkpoints were dismantled.
Figure 5.   Ethiopia: transport infrastructure
Source: FAO, 1998c
Addis Ababa
Djibouti
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Investments in Roads. An ambitious Road Sector Development Program was launched in 1997
that seeks elimination of the backlog in road maintenance and rehabilitation as well as expansion
of the rural road infrastructure (Figure 5 shows that Ethiopia has only one single-track railroad to
Djibouti and a very limited number of hard-surfaced roads). The aim of the program is to reduce
the proportion of farms that are more than half a day’s walk from the nearest all-weather road.
The target is to achieve a reduction from 75 per cent  to 50 per cent  within five years, and to 25
per cent  in ten years but this might be too ambitious as road investments have until recently been
hampered by insufficient domestic construction capacity.
Price deregulation. The previous Government's strictly regulated price system was gradually
dismantled, except for petroleum products.
Abolishing export taxes and lowering import tariffs. All export taxes and subsidies were
abolished in the early days of the reform period, except the export taxes on coffee, the major
export commodity. Import tariffs were standardized and lowered. Instead of the previous widely
dispersed rates, the number of tariff bands was gradually reduced to 7 and the number of duty
free items has increased. The maximum tariff was reduced considerably over the years, in 1993
from 230 per cent  to 80 per cent,  followed by step-wise reductions to 60 in 1997, 50 in 1998 and
40 per cent  by 1999. The average import tariff is now 19.5 per cent,  and a further reduction of
import tariffs is planned. So far, the reduction in import tariffs has not been compensated by an
increase in any other tax, but future reductions will be accompanied by a raise in domestic
indirect taxes, including a wider coverage of the sales tax and an increase in excise taxes.
Reduction of fiscal deficit. The structural adjustment policies have caused the fiscal deficit to
decline, especially through a drastic reduction of defense expenditures. Meanwhile, expenditures
on economic infrastructure such as roads showed a considerable increase.
Autonomy and privatization of state enterprises. In 1992, all state enterprises were declared
autonomous. This amounted to severing their financial ties to the government budget and freeing
the enterprise management from direct government control, though the enterprises remained state
owned, with a board of directors appointed by government. It is not completely clear how this
autonomy was effectuated in actual practice, for example, how the meat products industry could
survive with its full work force despite its financial losses and its low capacity utilization. After
autonomy came privatization. In 1994 an Ethiopian Privatization Agency was established15 and
the privatization of some state owned enterprises was announced. Considerable progress has been
made since in privatization of small and medium sized enterprises, especially in the services
sector, but the privatization of larger, mostly industrial, enterprises and state farms has lagged
behind. The process is complicated further due to its fiscal implications as state ownership also
serves as a channel for raising central government revenue. Privatization of state enterprises
implies a shift of the tax base from the central to the regional government, as all taxes and profits
raised from a state enterprise accrue to central government, whereas for private enterprises
several taxes will accrue to local government.
Investment incentives and deregulation. In 1992, a new investment law was issued, granting tax
privileges and other incentives to licensed investments, including an import duty drawback
                                                
15 The Ethiopian Privatization Agency has its own Internet site (www.telecom.net.et/~epa) that provides a list
enterprises to be privatized, with short descriptions of each of these.
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scheme for imported raw materials and intermediates used in exported commodities. Despite a
further adjustment in 1996, the law still seems to constrain investments in practice. A minimum
amount of half a million US dollars is required for all foreign investments.16 Several sectors,
including trade and tanneries, are reserved to domestic investors, while investments in other
sectors, including fertilizers, are only permitted via joint ventures. In addition, all investors need a
license to operate, which is supplied at bureaucratic discretion and is sometimes not granted even
in cases where no tax privileges are being requested. Another factor that hinders foreign
investments is lack of land. According to the US Embassy ‘At present, acquiring land is an
arduous process and lease prices, particularly in Addis Ababa, are expensive’ (US Embassy,
1999). In 1998, the investment code was liberalized further when the privileges for domestic
investors were made to apply to Ethiopian emigrants as well, and foreign investments in
telecommunications and power generation were permitted. Recently Ethiopia has published a
Investment Guide on the Internet, with support of UNCTAD and the International Chamber of
Commerce, and the Ethiopian Investment Authority has started worldwide distribution of
information on opportunities for foreign investments in Ethiopia through its Internet-site.17
Priority for smallholders and for cereals. In 1993, the priorities for agricultural research and
extension services were redefined. Agricultural research was to concentrate on improvement of
production of food crops such as cereals, of the export crops coffee, cotton and sugarcane, and on
research on drought resistant varieties and soil conservation. Extension services were reoriented
towards smallholders. At the same time, management of extension services has been transferred
to the regional governments. In practice, extension work became loosely organized with much
autonomy for the extension workers, who by-and-large focused their services on cereals and other
staples and less on export crops. In 1998, some 2.5 million farmers were benefiting from their
services. In the near future, extension work is to be expanded further, with emphasis shifting
towards cash crops, and extending its scope to incorporate animal breeding, soil and water
conservation, forest development and irrigation.
Liberalization of trade in agricultural inputs. The government monopolies on production and
trade in improved seeds and fertilizer were lifted in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Since 1992
seeds are mostly used for rehabilitation of disaster affected smallholders and still little seed is
sold in regular markets. Improved seed was in 1996/97 only used at 2 per cent  of the cereals area,
mostly for wheat and maize (CSA, 1998). Fertilizer is currently imported by four companies,
three private ones next to the former state monopolist Agricultural Inputs Services Corporation.
After the devaluation of the Birr, a 15 per cent  subsidy was introduced in 1993 to mitigate the
price increase for fertilizer. The subsidy rate rose to 20 per cent  in 1994 and to 30 per cent  in
1995, with the subsidy amount increasing to 178 million Birr, but in 1997 the retail price of
fertilizer was liberalized and the subsidy abolished.
Land in state ownership . The current constitution states that land remains in state ownership, and
farmers only enjoy user rights. Land cannot be sold or mortgaged but lease arrangements of up to
15 years are allowed in some regions. New commercial farms are free to lease land provided this
does not conflict with the interests of surrounding farmers and pastoralists.
                                                
16 The minimum capital requirement for a foreign investor investing in engineering or other technical
consultancy services is 100,000 US Dollars.
17 The Internet site of the Ethiopian Investment Authority (www.ethioinvestment.org) contains since summer
1999 information on Ethiopia’s investment regulations, on promoted projects, and investment opportunities in
agriculture, manufacturing, mining and tourism.
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Reform of farmers cooperatives. After 1991, many of the former compulsory cooperatives were
dismantled but under the Proclamation of 1995 concerning the formation of agricultural
cooperative societies, a new attempt was made to establish cooperatives, this time on a voluntary
basis.
Export promotion. In 1997 Ethiopia took several initiatives to promote its exports. It became an
observer at the WTO, but without applying for future membership. It also made a request for
technical assistance within the Integrated Framework for Trade Related Technical Assistance for
Least Developed Countries,18 and received technical assistance since from several agencies,
including WTO, to enhance its capacity to capture potential benefits arising from new trade
opportunities. With support of UNCTAD, Ethiopia has also established in 1997 an Ethiopian
Trade Point that distributes trade information worldwide through the Internet.19
3.3 Consequences of the Uruguay Round Agreements
So far, the Uruguay Round Agreements have not lead to any important changes in the external
trading environment of Ethiopia. Several studies had predicted a modest price increase for wheat,
ranging typically from 4 to 7 per cent,  but recall from Chapter 2, Figure 2 that in effect wheat
prices dropped, presumably due to the crises in Asia and Russia. As long as Ethiopia’s wheat
imports consist of food aid, all this has only minor effects on the domestic wheat market. For
coffee, a price decrease of about one per cent  was expected in one of the studies, and this would
not seriously reduce export proceeds. For beef, new export opportunities might emerge in the
future if the EU decides to liberalize this sector further, but Agenda 2000 offers little in this
respect.
The policy adjustments implemented by the Ethiopian government since 1991, have
ensured that currently most of Ethiopia’s policies are compatible with the GATT rules, see Text
box 3. Export subsidies were abolished, state firms have become autonomous without privileges,
and import tariffs have been simplified and reduced considerably. These reforms went beyond
what is minimally required according to the GATT rules for a least developed country. Hence, we
can generally conclude that the GATT/WTO rules do not pose a major constraint on Ethiopia.
Yet if Ethiopia chooses to join WTO in the future, it will face some restrictions regarding its
support to agriculture as calculated in the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). Several
types of support enjoy exemption (development projects, input subsidies), or are subject to de
minimis rules. However, highly subsidized floor prices for producers will enter Ethiopia’s AMS,
which is low since it mainly consisted of (modest) support to state farms in the base period. This
leaves limited scope for maintaining such floor prices, as an increase in AMS is not permitted. As
mentioned earlier, erosion of the AMS through domestic inflation can be avoided by notifying it
in, say, euros or US dollars.
In short, the minimal financial means available to Government make it by themselves very
difficult for Ethiopia to provide any support to the agricultural sector, which is therefore low by
attrition rather than by design. As regards more targeted support to export oriented sectors, the
Uruguay Round  Agreements  provide  all  the necessary exemptions to least developed countries,
                                                
18 IMF, the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and WTO are co-operating with the
LDCs to coordinate their trade assistance programmes through an Integrated Framework for Trade Related
Assistance to these countries.
19 At its Internet sit (www.telecom.net.et/~etp) the Ethiopian Trade Point supplies information on export
products, trading companies and on tourism and travel.
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Text Box 3 :  Evaluation of general economic policies of Ethiopia with respect to GATT/WTO rules
· Agricultural research and extension services are generally permitted as Green Box policies under the
Agreement on Agriculture
· An agricultural input subsidy on for instance fertilizer is allowed for a developing country as long as the
subsidy is  generally available to low-income or resource-poor farmers; otherwise the subsidy has to be
included in the country’s AMS. The same applies to a credit subsidy for farmers, possibly implicit in the
credit supply and interest rate of government controlled banks.
· Infrastructure investments for agriculture are Green Box policies; for other sectors, these investments are not
explicitly considered an export subsidy.
· Export subsidies for non-agricultural commodities, as implied in the import duty drawback scheme, are
allowed for a least developed country as long as it is not competitive in the export market under
consideration. The same applies to export subsidies implicit in schemes for duty free imports or bonded
warehouses, in credit subsidies, in tax privileges for licensed investments, and in subsidized investments in
state enterprises. If export competitiveness is reached, for instance in Ethiopia for pre-tanned skins of sheep
and goats, all export subsidies for these sectors have to be phased out in eight years.
· Export promotion that does not involve export subsidies is allowed. The export revenue retention regulation,
in which foreign exchange earned with exports can be kept for imports, will benefit exporters, but is not
considered an export subsidy, since this is common business practice elsewhere in the world.
· Privatization is not required, as ownership is of no concern to WTO, although covering losses of exporting
state enterprises will be considered as subsidizing exports. An implicit land rent subsidy, when farmers pay
no or a low rent for state owned land, can be considered de-coupled income support, and thus an allowed
Green Box policy.
· Lowering import tariffs is welcomed by WTO rules, but not required for a least developed country.
· Abolition of export taxes and deregulation of domestic prices, trade and foreign exchange regime are not
required by WTO rules, but consistent with its goal of free trade.
· Domestic indirect taxes (sales tax, excise tax, checkpoint tax) are consistent with WTO rules.
though in the future some difficulties might arise for skins, if Ethiopia becomes competitive 20 for
these commodities.
3.4 Opportunities
For Ethiopia, the main challenge would presumably be to increase the volume and processing
level of its exports, and this is only possible if the quality of its produce is improved. In principle,
the Uruguay Round Agreements make it easier for LDCs to achieve success on this front.
Through improved market access and tariffication of non-tariff barriers abroad it seeks to create
possibilities for increasing the export volume. Through international standardization of quality
aspects, it creates more opportunities to export those qualities that give higher revenue. Through a
decrease in tariffs and thus in tariff escalation on the importer’s side, it creates room for
increasing the exports of processed commodities. However, how this has worked out in practice
remains unclear, because of the large number of confounding factors such as the Asia crisis and
El Niño, and because importers often kept their import restrictions intact. For example, for
several fruits and vegetables the EU has not replaced its highly complicated import regulations by
tariffs but by just a new set of import regulations, and with respect to processed goods it
continues to take anti-dumping actions.
                                                
20 According to WTO rules, a country is considered to be competitive on the export market of a product if it
reaches a share of at least 3.25 percent in two consecutive calendar years. A product is here defined as a section
heading of the Harmonized System, indicated by a 4-digit code.
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To ease Ethiopia’s supply constraints, promotion of investments in road infrastructure,
agricultural extension and privatization are most important. Though average transport margins in
domestic trade flows may seem relatively modest (SOW-VU, 1997a), this only reflects the lack
of economic integration. The vast majority of the population is living more than half a day’s walk
from the nearest all-weather road. Typically, products are only being transported over short
distances and only farmers who live near roads and markets do supply any product. For them, the
producer price will only show minor change if new roads are constructed. It might even drop
because of the competition from newly connected suppliers. As stated earlier, these investments
in infrastructure are perfectly in accordance with WTO rules.
Besides infrastructure, Ethiopia will have to raise its agricultural yields. This is important
both for domestic food security and for diversification of agricultural exports. Clearly, in case of
Ethiopia there is no point in arguing that the country could export non-agricultural products to
import food as the industrial base is so weak. Moreover, the agricultural potential is sufficiently
high to opt for agricultural development as well. On field demonstration plots considerable
increases in cereal yields and revenues were achieved through improved farm practices21 which
are far superior to what the farmers are commonly able to obtain. Hence, agricultural research and
extension services have an important role to play. To increase their effectiveness, the relation
between research and extension services needs to be intensified, and the extension services need
to be expanded and organized more effectively. A rise in agricultural productivity will
presumably also require expansion of credit, especially to finance the purchases of seeds and
fertilizer. A special topic in this respect is that in Ethiopia land cannot be used as collateral
because it is state owned. Therefore, it will be necessary to develop other forms of mortgage.
Experience suggests that farmer cooperatives can be used as intermediaries and that formal land
lease contracts might be used as collateral. All this is perfectly within WTO rules that permit
subsidization of agricultural research and extension services and in developing countries even
allow agricultural input subsidies targeted at low-income or resource-poor farmers.
                                                
21 The Annual Report 1994 of the Sasakawa-Global 2000 project, as reported in Berhan (1996), showed that
improved farm practices led to more than a doubling of wheat yield and revenue, while  for maize a quadrupling
was recorded.
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Chapter 4
The Uruguay Round Agreements and Ethiopia:
Commodity specific implications
To illustrate further how the Uruguay Round Agreements might affect Ethiopia, this chapter
explores in some detail the consequences of the agreement for selected commodities that play an
important role in the international trade of Ethiopia or have a clear export potential. 22 The
commodities are coffee, wheat, beef and beef products, and hides and skins. The aim is to show
how specific policies for these commodities relate to WTO regulations and exemptions. This
naturally leads to specific topics encountered, including the existence of a Commodity Agreement
for coffee, domestic price stabilization for wheat, the importance of sanitary standards for beef,
and the possibility of becoming competitive for skins.
4.1 Coffee
Coffee is Ethiopia’s main export crop and contributes more than sixty per cent to total export
earnings. It is sold as green coffee beans, with further processing like blending, roasting and
grinding taking place elsewhere. Currently, the major markets for Ethiopian coffee are the
European Union (for about half of exports), East Asia (for about a quarter) and North America. It
was expected that the Uruguay Round Agreements should have limited effect on the international
coffee market, with a modest drop in real price of about 1.5 per cent  only. Ethiopia also saw its
preferential treatment vanishing in the EU, because the EU’s import tariff for green coffee was
reduced to zero, as was already the case in the USA. The EU lowered the import tariffs on roasted
coffee and instant coffee as well, to 7.5 and 9 per cent,  respectively, but Ethiopia has not
benefited from these reductions since, as mentioned, its coffee exports only consist of green
beans. Thus, in theory the price effect has been minor or negligible, in part because the market
was already liberalized.
More important than any WTO-related effect is clearly the secular drop in coffee prices
relative to non-agriculture that started around 1980, and was shown in Figure 2 of Chapter 2.
Structural adjustment reforms tend to promote exports in quantity terms, and the analysis of
commodity markets for small countries taken in isolation would seem to suggest an increase in
monetary terms as well. However, when a large number of countries has to conform to the same
policies, world prices may be affected. Of course, there are a large number of other factors
contributing to a secular fall in prices. Technological progress, in combination with stagnating
demand by developed countries also may force coffee price to drop, and so can specific planting
decisions. Yet, it is symptomatic that even cotton whose demand worldwide is by no means
satiated sees its price fall short of the overall trend. 
With respect to WTO, all current domestic policies on coffee, as summarized in Table 10,
are allowed under the GATT rules. We review the major ones.
                                                
22 This chapter is based on the background reports Alemu (1996), Assefa (1996), Berhan (1996) and Merbis et
al. (1997a).
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Table 10.   Evaluation of Ethiopia’s policies related to coffee
 Policy Margin
(in Birr per kg)
Compatibility
with GATT/WTO
rules
Promotion
of exports
State owned coffee farms
Extension services
Supply of subsidized inputs
Infrastructure investments
Investments in hullers and washing stations
Floor price washed coffee
Regulated domestic coffee trade
Regional development tax
Government coffee auction
Export taxes on coffee
ICA export quota
0.50
1.59
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed (DEV)
Allowed (LDC)
Allowed
AMS
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
0
+
+
+
+
0
0
-
?
-
-
GATT : DEV = special rule for developing countries ; LDC = special rule for least developed countries ; AMS = included
in Aggregate Measurement of Support
Export promotion : + = positive, 0 = neutral, - = negative
Source : Merbis et al., 1997a.
State-owned coffee farms. While coffee is Ethiopia’s main export crop, it is cultivated on only 3
per cent  of the cropped area, see Figure 6 for the locations where coffee is growing. Production
is for 95 per cent  in the hands of small farmers, and large state-owned plantations supply the
remainder. Ownership of farms and firms is of no concern to WTO, as long as these are
financially independent of the government. Had they been subsidized, by covering losses or
otherwise, these subsidies would count as agricultural producer subsidies to be included in the
AMS, which by WTO rules is not allowed to rise.
Figure 6.   Ethiopia: Coffee cultivation.
Source: FAO, 1998c
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Coffee Improvement Project (CIP). Small farmers who cultivate coffee do so as a cash crop in
combination with food crops and allocate on average about 20 to 40 per cent  of their land to it.
Their cultivation practices are simple. They use little fertilizer and rarely any other chemicals,
and average yield is around 600 kg per hectare. In several coffee-growing districts, the Coffee
Improvement Project (CIP) stimulates cultivation and marketing of coffee, for instance by
extension services, by renewing coffee bushes with improved varieties, by supplying farm inputs,
and by construction of roads and warehouses. In these CIP-districts coffee yields have increased
significantly, typically by 50 per cent, to about 900 kg per hectare. According to WTO rules, the
Coffee Improvement Project can be considered a program to foster agricultural development and
consequently, its investments and input subsidies targeted to poor farmers are exempted from the
AMS-calculation.
Investments in hullers and washing stations. Primary processing of coffee takes place at or near
the production location, either by sundrying or washing of the beans. For sundried coffee, the
beans are picked and dried by the farmers and sold to collectors, who in turn sell them to
wholesale traders. Since the quality of sundried coffee is hard to assess before hulling, farmers
and collectors have to sell their coffee at prices that do not adequately reflect its quality. For
washed coffee, the ripe (red) berries are picked by the farmers and sold to washing stations,
which after processing (washing, drying and grading) sell the coffee beans directly to the auction.
Subsidized investments in hullers and washing stations in development projects aim to stimulate
primary processing, especially washing since washed coffee fetches a premium price on
international markets. These subsidies are allowed for developing countries according to WTO
rules.
Fixed producer price of red berries at washing stations. The Coffee and Tea Authority still fixes
the prices at which the washing stations have to buy red coffee berries from the farmers, a legacy
of the previous regime that nationalized all washing stations and turned them over to Farmers Co-
operatives. These prices are determined on the basis of the auction prices, and leave a reasonable
profit margin for the washing stations. The system is intended to strengthen the bargaining
position of the farmers when selling their coffee to the washing stations. According to WTO
rules, any implicit subsidies to farmers in excess of 10 per cent  of the crop value are to be
included in the AMS.
Regulated domestic trade in coffee. Domestic trade in coffee in Ethiopia is heavily regulated
through licenses that restrict their holders to only one type of economic activity. The system is
meant to avoid concentration of market power. Coffee collectors are only allowed to buy sundried
coffee from farmers and to sell it to coffee wholesale traders. These are only allowed to buy
sundried coffee from collectors, process it and sell it at the auction. Coffee sold at the auction is
officially destined to exports, and only coffee of inferior quality is allocated to the domestic
market but since about half of the produced coffee is consumed domestically, it would seem that
much is being traded outside the licensed marketing channels. This type of licensing is allowed
under WTO but the question remains whether it helps Ethiopia to increase its export earnings
from coffee. With the current licenses, collectors and wholesale traders are restricted to sundried
coffee, and this may hinder growth of washed coffee supply.
Government coffee auctions. At auctions coffee is purchased by export traders, who process it
further (milling of washed parchment coffee, cleaning, selecting, grading and mixing) before
selling it on the international market. At the auction, coffee grading is done in the morning, and
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export traders have only one hour before the auction starts to assess the quality of the coffee
offered. Export traders generally consider this period too short for a proper quality assessment,
which is consequently conducted after purchase. This creates a risk premium that accrues to
traders, as auction prices insufficiently reflect quality. Coffee auctions are allowed under the
WTO rules but in Ethiopia auction services are partly subsidized. However, as the auction costs
are paid out of the export taxes on coffee, this subsidy can probably be disregarded.
Export taxes on coffee. Licensed coffee exporters are only allowed to buy coffee at the auction,
process and export it. Coffee exporters have to pay several export taxes: a transaction tax, a cess
tax, an export duty and the surtax on coffee. Coffee is nowadays the only commodity on which
export taxes are levied and these export taxes are an important source of government income. In
recent years they have accounted for about 14 per cent  of the export price. This tax share
fluctuates with the surtax that increases progressively with the international coffee price. Unlike
subsidies, export taxes are allowed under WTO rules.
ICA coffee quota. Coffee exports from Ethiopia were restricted through the export quotas of the
International Coffee Agreements. However, Ethiopia has never filled these export quotas and still
has ample room for expansion. If properly registered at WTO, commodity agreements are
allowed.
WTO rules and options for enhancing trade earnings from coffee. In short, all major policies are
allowed under current WTO rules, but taxes on cultivation by regional government and on export
by central government would seem to be at odds with the prevailing subsidies through
development projects such as CIP to make coffee cultivation more attractive to farmers. Under
present WTO rules, Ethiopia has various options to expand its export revenue from coffee. We
mention the following:
1. Increasing coffee production through yield increases and area expansion. The Coffee
Improvement Project could be expanded to all major coffee producing areas, and the coffee
area can be increased for example on slopes. This would also help arresting erosion.
2. Increasing exports of higher priced qualities in general, and in particular of washed coffee,
coffee by origin, and organic coffee. For this purpose, international price differences must
be better transmitted to the domestic markets by promoting quality grading before sales, for
instance at the coffee auctions. Higher prices for washed coffee, corresponding to the
premium for washed coffee at the international markets that ranges recently from 25 to 120
per cent,  will stimulate private investments in washing stations. Demand for higher quality
coffee has become stronger, especially in North America, the European Union and East
Asia. This opens new opportunities for Ethiopia from where all coffee varieties are
supposed to have originated, and which still has a broad genetic base of the species. Several
Ethiopian coffee types such as Harar, Sidamo, and Jimma coffee are already appreciated in
international markets, and current trade contacts may be used to increase the sales of higher
priced qualities.
3. Entering into export of processed coffee. Ethiopia’s domestic market for coffee offers
opportunities for coffee processing (roasting, mixing and grinding) enterprises that
eventually can export as well. Since coffee falls under the Agreement on Agriculture,
development projects that subsidize investments for coffee processing are allowed.
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4.2 Wheat
Though wheat is not the major cereal grown in Ethiopia (see Table 11 and Figure 7), it deserves
further discussion in this paper because it makes up for the lion share of food aid and because its
scope for yield improvement is significant.
Table 11.   Production of major cereals in Ethiopia during 1995-1997, in 1000 tons
Maize
Teff
Sorghum
Wheat
Barley
Millet
2832
1720
1644
1133
1020
267
Source: FAO, 1999.
Prospective studies on the anticipated consequences of the Uruguay Round Agreements on
international trade showed a modest increase in international prices for cereals in general, and
wheat prices in particular were expected to increase with 4 to 7 per cent  (Goldin and van der
Mensbrugghe, 1995; FAO, 1995c). In the mean time wheat prices have fluctuated strongly and
dropped significantly after an initial increase by 50 per cent  in 1995/96 (see Figure 2 in Chapter
2). As long as wheat imports are received as food aid, the world prices will have a limited impact
on the Ethiopian economy. Table 12 shows that current WTO rules impose no restrictions on
domestic policies for wheat.
Figure 7.   Ethiopia: Wheat cultivation.
Source: FAO, 1998c
Area share
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Table 12.   Evaluation of Ethiopia’s policies related to wheat
 Policy Margin
(in Birr per kg)
Compatibility
with GATT/WTO rules
Promotion
of exports
Extension services
Supply of subsidized inputs
Local sales taxes
Import tariff
Tariff exemption of aid
State monopoly for aid imports
Public wheat stock for food security
Wheat distribution (free, Food-for-Work)
0.02
1.80
Allowed
Allowed (DEV)
Allowed
No reduction (LDC)
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
+
+
-
0
0
0
0
0
GATT : DEV = special rule for developing countries ; LDC = special rule for least developed countries
Export promotion : + = positive, 0 = neutral, - = negative
Source: Merbis et al., 1997a
Extension services and supply of subsidized inputs. Most of the country’s cultivated area is
planted to cereals, under rainfed conditions with traditional technology and low levels of fertilizer
application. Wheat is grown especially in the central highlands and its crop area share varies
around 8 percent. Yields are generally low though they have risen significantly over the last
decades, from 0.75 ton per hectare in the 1960's to about 1.2-1.4 tons in recent years.23 Total
wheat production is reported to have grown to around 1.1 million tons. The current low yields of
cereals could be improved considerably, as witnessed by current field demonstrations in the
Sasakawa-Global-2000 project and by the regular extension work of the Ministry of Agriculture.
These trials with improved practices, improved seed and fertilizer show yields of 2-3 tons per
hectare combined with increased net revenue. Yet in 1996 improved seeds were only used for 6
per cent  of wheat area, though on 58 per cent  of the land some fertilizer was already used.
Although insufficient rainfall might limit the applicability of high yielding technologies in the
northern parts of Ethiopia, overall there is ample room for further yield increase. Figure 8
substantiates this statement by comparing actual and potential yields. It shows that only in a few
parts of the country the realized yield is above a third of its potential. The record cereal harvests
of 1995 and 1996 are also indications of the growth possibilities in agriculture. The increased
domestic cereal production has made Ethiopia much less dependent on imports, and food for
distribution was in those years mostly purchased domestically rather than being imported, but
nonetheless financed by the donor community. As mentioned earlier, agricultural extension is
always allowed under WTO rules, and subsidization of agricultural inputs for poor farmers is
allowed in developing countries.
Import tariffs on wheat imports, and tariff exemption for aid. Cereals imports mainly consist of
wheat and wheat flour. Since the famine of 1984, the country has had a structural food deficit and
significant amounts of wheat have been imported as food aid financed by international and
bilateral donors such as the WFP, the USA, and the EU. The imported volume has fluctuated over
the years, with a maximum of almost 1 million tons in 1992, followed by a gradual reduction to
about 200 thousand tons in 1997, and again an increase in the past 2 years. Commercial imports
are negligible mainly because of a 5 (formerly 30) per cent  import tariff, in contrast to aid
imports, which are duty free. According to the Uruguay Round Agreements, import tariffs are to
                                                
23  However, other sources report lower wheat yields of about 1 ton per hectare along with a considerably larger area.
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be bound but the least developed countries do not have to lower their import tariffs. The
exemption of aid financed imports would seem to conflict with the non-discrimination principle,
but it is allowed under the GATT rules, under the presumption that food aid does not compete
with commercial imports.
State monopoly on food aid imports. While non-discrimination rules do not apply to food aid,
Ethiopia has a state monopoly on imports as an additional device to protect it from foreign
complaints to that effect. The state owned Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise handles all wheat
aid imports. As import monopolies are not forbidden by the Uruguay Round Agreements, the rule
prohibiting discrimination between domestic production and foreign producers can be
circumvented by letting the state-monopoly set the terms for domestic producers and consumers
through its profit and cost margins that effectively act as import tariffs.
Public wheat stock for food security, and wheat distribution. Imports of wheat are mainly
distributed as domestic food aid. Refugees receive the aid without charge but an increasing share
is paid out as wages in food-for-work schemes. Food aid is also used to build up food reserve
stocks or is sold in the market to meet the costs of the food distribution programs, and both uses
are explicitly allowed under WTO rules.
Stabilization of the domestic wheat price. Ethiopia sees food price stability as one of its important
policy priorities, and adjusts its requests for food aid and its stock levels accordingly. Although
the Uruguay Round Agreements tolerate buffer stock operations for definite food security
purpose (see GATT, 1994, p.58), their use as price stabilization device is questionable, because
domestic price fluctuations are not always harmful and because buffer stocks may not offer the
Figure 8.   Ethiopia: Yield ratio (actual/potential).
Source: FAO, 1998c and this study.
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most appropriate instrument to mitigate these fluctuations. Regarding the necessity, the origin of
the instability matters. Fluctuations in domestic prices can originate from the world market or
from the variability of domestic production. If domestic variability is the source, price
fluctuations help stabilizing the income of farmers, but at the same time may hurt or benefit other
population groups. Increased producer prices spread the burden of a crop failure over producers
and consumers; a stable producer price would shift all the risk to the farmer and the resulting
income decrease may even prevent purchase of inputs for the next harvest. Through lower prices
part of the benefits of a bumper crop are passed on to the consumers. Moreover, private trading
and stockholding can only function commercially as long as prices are allowed to increase after
the harvest to cover costs of stockholding. Therefore, it is harmful to eliminate all price
fluctuations from domestic origin through some stabilization mechanism. Only extreme
fluctuations may require dampening. As regards fluctuation on the world market the argument is
more indirect, but here also individual agents can in principle make their choices more efficiently
if they are faced with undistorted prices. Borrowing and income transfers are preferable to price
controls. The main arguments for avoiding food price fluctuations are that the poor will find it
difficult to borrow or buy insurance, and that extreme price volatility should be avoided because
even the rich cannot cope with it and macro-economic instability results. For the poor, food-for-
work programs can give adequate coverage but the argument against extreme volatility remains
valid.
Extreme fluctuations of domestic origin can be contained through free international trade.
Private traders can cover their risks through future contracts on the world cereal market and the
fact that Ethiopian private traders are currently not involved in international wheat trade prevents
them from gaining experience in this respect. Clearly, in a landlocked country with poor
infrastructure like Ethiopia food security cannot be guaranteed without a dense net of small local
emergency stocks but it will often be easier to ship goods from a harbor to specific domestic
locations, than from one local warehouse to some distant region. Hence, it may be preferable for
the government to hold some financial stock of foreign exchange than large cereal stocks.
Moreover, these financial resources can also be used to purchase on the domestic wheat market if
there are surpluses in some regions. In contrast, public buffer stocks tend to crowd out private
trade and stockholding. Furthermore, their use is restricted by both the warehouse capacity
available and the financial means of the buffer stock agency and when these restrictions can
become effective, buffer stocks tend to elicit speculative trade. For these reasons, buffer stock
agencies have often incurred large losses, only adding to the fiscal deficit.
The effect of price fluctuations on the world market can be reduced by temporarily
disconnecting the domestic market from the world market, either by controlling the import or
export volumes directly or by flexible tariffs that dampen the price fluctuation. The surtax on
coffee is used for similar purposes. The WTO accepts direct control of trade flows through a
government monopoly on imports or exports, as discussed above and variable export tariffs are
also allowed under the GATT rules. Extremely high international prices that threaten to increase
the domestic price through exports can thus be counteracted by variable export tariffs. In contrast,
import tariffs must remain within their bounds and variable levies are explicitly forbidden in the
GATT rules. To prevent the country from being flooded by cheap imports safeguard mechanisms
can be activated, that will dampen the domestic price decrease. These mechanisms are defined by
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the GATT24 and can only be invoked when mentioned in the country’s Schedule of Concessions,
by adding the code SSG (“Special Safeguard Guarantee”) in the tariff line of the tariffied product.
Then two options are open. In the quantity triggered form of the SSG an additional duty can be
imposed if imports exceed their average “during the three preceding years for which data are
available” by no more that five per cent. So a relatively small annual rate of import growth may
suffice to trigger this provision, and the maximum additional duty may be as high as a third of the
ordinary duty. Under the price triggered form of the SSG, an additional duty can be imposed if
the c.i.f. import price of the shipment concerned falls below 90 per cent of the trigger price
(which is the 1986-88 average reference price). The duty rises when the c.i.f. price falls deeper.
The EU and the US have declared high trigger prices for many products and the EU has indeed
already invoked the SSG for poultry meat and sugar.
4.3 Beef and beef products
For international trade in beef and beef products, sanitary measures are of great importance. The
Uruguay Round Agreements contain a separate provision to arrive at international minimum
sanitary standards, to which countries can add their own measures provided these can be
supported by clear scientific evidence but this process is far from being completed. Currently,
every importing country can still have its own set of sanitary measures and apply these to its
imports to protect its consumers and producers. For example, the EU forbids the use of growth
hormones while the USA and other countries ban the import of meat from regions where foot-
and-mouth-disease is endemic and require that the whole region should be free of the disease,
without vaccination. Developing countries in South America can possibly conform to the strict
rules of the USA and enter this premium segment of the world beef market, but a least developed
country like Ethiopia cannot hope to meet these sanitary requirements in the foreseeable future.
As for other agricultural products, world market prices of beef have dropped significantly,
although prospective studies had expected a small to moderate increase. The fall by a quarter
since 1994 also reflects the persistence of surplus disposals. These occurred as a consequence of a
contracting demand following the BSE crisis in Europe, the economic crises in Asia and Russia,
and the continued bans in the EU on beef from the USA in relation to the hormone dispute.
All current policies of Ethiopia with respect to beef and beef products, as shown in Table
13, are allowed under the WTO rules. These policies will be briefly discussed below.
                                                
24 Konandreas and Greenfield (1996) suggest that a country may have own safeguard mechanisms with import
tariffs along a sliding scale, that dampen price fluctuations more than the GATT safeguards. They argue “that
the legality of a price band is not entirely clear [....], the extent to which price bands may be challenged formally
at the WTO is likely to depend on the predictability and transparency of their implementation.”  No GATT
jurisprudence exists yet on this topic.
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Table 13.   Evaluation of Ethiopia’s policies related to beef and beef products
 Policy Margin
(in Birr per kg)
Compatibility
with GATT/WTO rules
Promotion
of exports
Livestock extension services
Livestock health services
Infrastructure investments
Market tax
Checkpoint tax
Investments in feedlots and fattening schemes
Investment in livestock trucks
Fees for export services
Implementation of sanitary standards
0.02
0.30
0.17
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed
Allowed (DEV)
Allowed (DEV)
Allowed
Allowed
+
+
+
0
-
+
+
0
+
GATT : DEV = special rule for developing countries ; LDC = special rule for least developed countries
Export promotion : + = positive, 0 = neutral, - = negative
Source : Merbis et al., 1997a
Livestock development projects. Ethiopia has large livestock herds. Its cattle stock is currently
estimated at about 30 million. However, many animals suffer from endemic diseases. Rangelands
often suffer from overgrazing and hence from erosion. Three-quarters of the cattle are probably
kept in the highlands as part of a mixed farming system. The average household only possesses a
small number of animals that are primarily held for their draught power and for the calves and in
the second place for meat, milk and manure. Animals are only slaughtered when old, and beef can
thus be considered a by-product. In the lowlands of Ethiopia livestock production takes place on
natural pastures by pastoralists. Herding is their main activity and income source. The stock is
mainly kept for subsistence and their productivity is low. Several projects have been targeted to
the livestock sector, especially in the rangelands, and aimed to increase the quality of livestock
products and to improve the marketing structures. They included extension services, health
services, infrastructure investments, which are Green Box policies under WTO rules, and
investments in feedlots, fattening schemes and livestock trucks which are allowed for developing
countries.
WTO rules and options for enhancing trade earnings from beef and beef products. To utilize its
potential in beef exports, Ethiopia needs to raise the volume and quality of its domestic beef
production. It is presumably premature to target for countrywide implementation of international
sanitary standards. An export strategy might start with exports from a well-defined, tightly
controlled area. According to WTO rules, actual exports of beef have to be negotiated bilaterally
and satisfy the sanitary requirements of the importing country. Ethiopia could try to acquire from
the EU a ‘minimum access’ import quotum with reduced import tariff, as several other African
countries have.
In the short term the opportunities for beef exports are very limited, also because of the
poor condition of processing plants. Until their recent privatization, the meat plants investigated
for this study showed similar characteristics. They were old and in need of renovation, they
produced at low capacity several products for the domestic market, and they discharged their
effluent partly or completely into the environment. They did not have an active export marketing
strategy, nor an active cattle purchase or supply policy, despite the many diseases of the
slaughtered animals. The production of beef products such as corned beef and beef-in-jelly
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proved value reducing rather than value adding and while exports of chilled or frozen beef
carcass would seem possible, domestic use has been more profitable.
4.4 Hides and skins
With its large herds of cattle, sheep and goats, Ethiopia is a natural exporter of hides and skins,
which constitute the second largest export item, accounting for about 10-13 per cent  of export
revenue in recent decades. Two thirds originate from sheepskins. Goat skins contribute slightly
more than one sixth, and cattle hides slightly less. The EU is the major market for cattle hides and
goats skins and buys about 90 per cent  of their exports. For sheep skins the destinations are more
diverse. The GATT requirement of an import tariff reduction for industrial commodities made it
easier to export leather and leather goods. In the future, new opportunities for exports might open
up for developing countries, because the decrease of agricultural support in the developed
countries could cause a fall in the number of cattle and hence in the supply of hides.
WTO applies two sets of rules for hides and skins. Untanned hides and skins are covered
by the rules for agricultural products. Pre-tanned hides and skins and their derived products are
not considered agricultural and are subject to the stricter general rules of GATT. For instance,
least developed countries also have to phase out export subsidies (over a period of eight years)
once they reach export competitiveness in the market of a non-agricultural product (GATT 1994,
Agreement in Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 27). Ethiopia mainly exports its
hides and skins in semi-processed form, and its finished products are largely for the domestic
market. All current policies on hides and skins as listed in Table 14 are allowed under the GATT
rules.
Table 14.   Evaluation of Ethiopia’s policies on hides and skins
 Policy Margin
(in Birr per kg)
Compatibility
with GATT/WTO rules
Promotion
of exports
Checkpoint tax
Implementation of quality standards
Investments in processing raw hides and skins
State owned tanneries
Fees for export services
0.74
17.68
0.69
Allowed
Allowed
allowed (DEV)
allowed
allowed
-
+
+
0
0
GATT : DEV = special rule for developing countries ; LDC = special rule for least developed countries
Export promotion: + = positive, 0 = neutral, - = negative
Source: Merbis et al., 1997a
Investment in processing of raw hides and skins and implementation of quality standards. The
livestock resources of Ethiopia are large but raw hides and skins are of low quality. Next to 30
million cattle, there are about 22 million sheep, 17 million goats, numerous horses, donkeys,
camels, etc. Hides and skins are only by-products relative to meat and the supply of hides and
skins is not very responsive to the prices offered. The curing of fresh hides and skins is rarely
appropriate, due to lack of facilities at slaughtering and insufficient price incentives. When raw
hides and skins are sold to the tanneries, hardly any grading takes place and more or less fixed
prices are paid by weight, not by quality grade. Tanneries complain that most raw material is not
of acceptable quality due to poor animal husbandry, insufficient slaughterhouses, parasite damage
and low level of pre-processing technology. One of the major tanneries reported in 1998 that ”20
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per cent  of the skins and hides supplied to the factory is turned down because of external effects
caused by diseases. Another 30 per cent  is simply unacceptable due to negligent and improper
methods of shearing (Addis Tribune at Internet, 20-2-1998).” Several projects have in the past
invested in local processing capacity for raw hides and skins, and in the introduction of quality
standards, which are all acceptable under the Uruguay Round Agreements.
State owned tanneries. Hides and skins must undergo several stages of processing before they can
be used. The tannery industry in Ethiopia consists of several state-owned firms, with about 80 per
cent  of the capacity, and three private firms. The processing of hides and skins is a profitable
activity. State owned tanneries make considerable contributions to the state coffers: a profit tax of
40 per cent  plus additional dividend payments. Since no subsidies are involved, state ownership
is compatible with WTO rules.
WTO rules and options for enhancing trade earnings from hides and skins. For cattle hides
Ethiopia only has a small share of the international market but for sheep and goats skins its
position is stronger, and even reaches 5-10 per cent for untanned sheep skins. Consequently, if
Ethiopia upgrades its exported sheepskins to pre-tanned level, it may easily surpass the market
share of 3.25 that gives it competitiveness in this export market. Ethiopia’s share in the world
market for pre-tanned goat skins barely falls below that level and a serious increase in goat skins
exports could thus make Ethiopia competitive for this product as well.
In the future it may be possible to increase export earnings from hides and skins by
improving the quality of current raw material and by increased processing. For this, tanneries
should pay according to quality rather than by weight, and the privatization of the existing state
owned tanneries could through competition operate in this direction. Once this grading is
effectuated it will also become more rewarding to invest in conservation of raw hides in
slaughterhouses. 
In addition, export earnings can be enhanced if hides and skins are exported in more
processed form. For this purpose, the tanneries would have to invest in machinery and in skills.
The tanneries seem to be sufficiently profitable to finance this out of retained earnings. To
develop its tanneries, Ethiopia could consider forming joint ventures with leather firms from
developed countries, for example from the EU. Although tanneries are reserved for domestic
investors according to the investment regulations, joint ventures with foreign investors are
allowed for enterprises with highly processed end products like leather goods. The foreign
partners could contribute the product design, the technology, the quality control and the market
access, as well as the experience in managing the herds upstream so as to guarantee good quality
hides.
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Chapter 5
Unfinished business
The new round of multilateral negotiations is likely to define its own agenda and yet, so much
remains to be done to implement effectively the mechanisms that were defined in 1994. This
chapter considers three problems that need to be addressed: the special and differential treatment
of developing countries, the access to agricultural markets of the EU and other developed
countries, and the access to courts where trade disputes can be settled. 
5.1 Special and differential treatment
The GATT treaty (part IV) offers special and differential treatment to developing countries. This
mainly amounts to trade preferences, exemptions and temporary waivers. However, the
preferences were gradually eroded through the liberalization process itself, since, by the reduction
of the import tariffs in OECD countries, the value of the trade preferences diminished as well25.
Developing countries have been asking for compensation of these losses but so far without
success.
In addition, a Ministerial Decision signed in Marrakech in 1994 promised a compensation
for least developed food importing countries in case the world market prices would rise as
anticipated. As could be seen from Figure 2 in Chapter 2, the rise that eventually took place in
1995/’96 was very temporary, and world prices have been very low since. In hindsight one may
therefore argue that there was no need to provide such compensation. However, LDCs complain
that the fall in prices from 1997 onwards could not be anticipated in 1995/’96 and that no serious
attempt was made to implement the promises in this Decision at the time. This lack of follow up
will presumably reduce the credibility of aid promises to be made in the next round. To restore
credibility of solutions that involve side payments, the WTO will have to formalize the treatment
of commitments, and deal with them like any other part of the agreement, with exhaustive
schedules and notifications.
5.2 Access to markets of the EU and other developed countries
As mentioned earlier, the Agreement on Agriculture only puts the machinery in place but hardly
led to any improvement in market access. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a case
in point, and an important one since for many countries in Africa, including Ethiopia, the EU is
the main trading partner. Most of these countries will not be able to expand their agricultural
exports unless the EU improves the access to its markets. For this reason, the present section
elaborates in some detail on the present status of the CAP and the prospects for its reform in the
future. Obviously, a simple view at such reform would advocate straightforward abolition.
Indeed, the CAP has had its fierce opponents ever since its first inception but despite all the
transformations undergone since the early ‘sixties, it lived through the attacks with singular
resilience (see Ritson and Harvey, 1997). Therefore, we will go at some length describing
                                                
25 Note that in times of low world market prices, as now is the case for sugar, the value of preferences can increase
substantially.
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reforms that can offer scope for compromise and strike a balance between the interests of
developing countries and those of European farmers. We will indicate how the multi-functionality
approach which offers separate rewards for all services rendered by farmers allows to promote
trade liberalization. And, we will single out sugar, the most protected crop by far, and suggest
ways to improve access without eradicating the crop.
CAP reform in Agenda 2000
The CAP underwent significant reform in 1992, as the European Commission moved its
agricultural policy into a new direction. The thrust of this reform was a shift from price to direct
income support, achieved by lowering the intervention prices, while compensating farmers via
area and headage premiums. As a means to reduce the production of cereals and oilseeds, a set-
aside scheme was introduced, and professional farmers were only eligible for compensation
payments if they participated by keeping a specified fraction of their land fallow. With the benefit
of hindsight, it can be concluded that the measures relieved international tensions on agricultural
export markets, and virtually saved the Uruguay Round, see GATT (1994).
The CAP essentially remained unchanged since, though pressures for further reform have
been building up. In its Agenda 2000, and as part of a broad package to prepare the European
Union for the next century (CEC, 1997a,b), the European Commission argues that both a
deepening and widening of the 1992 reform is called for. This is needed in view of developments
within the agricultural sector itself, the upcoming international trade negotiations under the WTO
and the planned accession of Central and Eastern European countries (CEC, 1998b). The
agricultural chapter of Agenda 2000 contains a first version that was subsequently elaborated
upon in the draft regulations published in March 1998 (CEC, 1998a), and after modifications was
accepted in March 1999 by the European Council in Berlin (CEC, 1999).
Agenda 2000 extends the 1992 reform. The internal prices of wheat, coarse grains, beef
and dairy products are reduced, while production quotas for milk are slightly relaxed.
Compensation is maintained through premiums that are not fully decoupled,26 the restrictions on
the import side are preserved which for most products mean that imports are only possible within
strictly specified tariff quotas, and the sugar sector stays clear of any reform. In addition, food
quality and safety concerns figure more prominently, in response to outbreaks of animal diseases,
and rural policies are to be strengthened (see also CEC, 1997d). It is noteworthy that the
Commission has opted for such an extrapolative approach, rather than presenting a clear vision of
the future of European agriculture, presumably because the views regarding agriculture appear to
diverge strongly among EU member states. Whereas the original proposals by the Commission
included somewhat stronger price cuts, the eventual decision was much weaker and postponed
many of these changes, some until 2005. The current low world market prices for cereals,
especially wheat (see Chapter 2, Figure 2) prevent exports of cereals without subsidies. Hence, to
fulfil existing GATT commitments with respect to the reduction of subsidized cereal exports, the
EU eventually decided to give up its original intentions of bringing its intervention prices for
cereals to world market level and its set-aside rate to zero. Currently, with set-aside rates at
around ten per cent and ample voluntary set asides, the EU is barely able to stabilize its exports
                                                
26 Area premiums are linked to the production of cereals and oilseeds while headage premiums obviously relate
to animal herds.
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around the allowed ceilings and this rate will be maintained. 27  (see CEC, 1998c, Keyzer and
Merbis, 1998, 1999 forthcoming).
As far as developing countries are concerned, Agenda 2000 leaves the import regime of
the CAP as it was, and the changes on the export side are so small and gradual that the effects on
world markets are probably minor. This is not likely to satisfy the other negotiating partners
within the WTO. The Agenda 2000 reform leaves many pressing issues unsettled. We mention a
few.
Import access. Agenda 2000 focuses on further reduction of export subsidies and keeps the
import regimes unchanged. Export subsidies are mainly a concern of the EU itself due to the
budgetary cost, as well as of major competing exporters such as the USA or Brazil, and much less
of smaller players. As consumer demand in the EU has been almost stagnant for several years,
large exporters find it more important to challenge the EU on international markets than
domestically. Therefore, they generally exercise more pressure to obtain reductions in export
subsidies than to acquire increased access to the EU itself. Yet several smaller players,
particularly from the developing world, would gain from improved access, especially for fruits,
vegetables, and possibly sugar. At present the EU implements market access commitments via
tariff quotas, the modalities of which were agreed in the Uruguay Round Agreements. This is a
cumbersome procedure that is discriminating among exporters, and in need of improvement. Yet
the official EU’s current external policy, formally not part of the CAP, is to grant country
groupings preferential access through special agreements, which should ultimately be arranged in
a fully WTO compatible way. This may take ten years or longer, and meanwhile discriminatory
practices will prevail.
Price transmission. The European Commission continues to view price stabilization on the
internal market as an important policy objective, and proposes to maintain the present system of
protection through variable import tariffs and tariff quotas. Thus the EU wheat price basically
follows the internal intervention price, and is unrelated to fluctuations on the world market.
Similarly, the internal price of animal feed grains will not rise when there is a shortage outside
the EU. This lack of transmission intensifies the price fluctuations on the world cereals market
and shifts the full burden of short-term adjustment to traders and consumers outside the EU. Price
transmission on the EU market would reduce these fluctuations and improve world market
integration, and thus strengthen the signaling role of prices as scarcity indicators. It would also
remove the artifact that the EU keeps prices of wheat and feed grains at the same level, while at
world markets they are moving in parallel at a distance of 30-50 US-dollar per ton. In view of the
strong volatility recently witnessed in major commodity markets, an EU contribution to stabilize
these markets through better price transmission regimes would be helpful, especially for the food
importing developing countries.
Acceptability of Blue Box measures under WTO. The introduction of the so-called Blue Box was
a novelty of the Uruguay Round Agreements. The box “contains” measures of support that are
acceptable under the agreement although they are not fully decoupled (decoupled measures are
supposed to have no effect on production decisions and hence on trade: for example R&D and
                                                
27 To avoid budgetary overruns, the farmers now only receive partial compensation for the reduction in
intervention prices, also because of the experience that market prices do not immediately follow the reductions
in intervention prices. The 1992 Reform assumed that they would follow in full, but this led to
overcompensation, partly because of the high world prices in 1995/’96. If the current, low world prices persist,
market prices might well drop to the intervention level in the future.
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extension services qualify as such). The Blue Box covers among others the deficiency payments
in the US and the premiums per hectare and per head of the EU. Since 1994 the US have on
several occasions paid income transfers whose qualification as decoupled support is debatable. It
is uncertain whether such exceptions will be made in the coming round. By harmonizing the area
premiums for arable crops under Agenda 2000, the EU evidently hopes that the measures will
qualify for the Green Box, or allow for the Blue box to be maintained. If the EU insists on
renewal of the Blue Box, which seems inevitable, this may very well cause the next round to stall.
CEEC accession. The price reductions of Agenda 2000 reduce the price gap between the EU and
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEC, 1998b). Though their accession is facilitated, it
will nonetheless be a major and costly operation, as CEECs will receive substantial funds from
EU’s structural programs. And if the CAP remains intact, the outlays on area and headage
premiums will be significant as well (Josling et al., 1998). Hence, a transitional regime is likely to
be negotiated to mitigate the budgetary consequences. More important from the perspective of
developing countries is that the EU’s preoccupation with the accession will distract its attention
from developmental efforts and from trade agreements with other parts of the world. In terms of
the WTO commitments on reduction of subsidized exports, the accession offers special
advantages to the EU in the short run, because it can sell some of its surpluses on these markets.
In the medium term CEEC output will presumably expand as their farms acquire better access to
credit and farmers from the present EU-15 may decide to expand in the CEECs where land prices
are low. Consequently, the enlarged EU will remain an important exporter of temperate
agricultural products, and seemingly has little incentive to increase the access for developing
countries.
However, precisely because the CAP has changed so little, it is unlikely to sail unscathed
through the upcoming WTO negotiations. The steps in Agenda 2000 follow logically from the
earlier reform, but they actually strengthen the inherent contradictions of the system. Their
contribution to trade liberalization will not appease the negotiating partners of the coming WTO
round, and the planned accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe will only make it
more difficult to finance the CAP.
Outside the EU, the holders of preferences under the Lomé treaty, and the recipients of
food aid are presumably the only protagonists of the CAP. As mentioned earlier, advocates of
radical liberalization and elimination of the CAP are unlikely to be more successful this time than
they were over the past thirty years. It would seem more fruitful to spend the efforts during the
upcoming round on defining areas of possible compromise that would benefit developing
countries. We discuss two, possibly complementary options: the application of the multi-
functionality concept, and the reduction of production quotas on sugar beet.
Multi-functionality
The tendency in Agenda 2000 towards further decoupling of support to farmers creates additional
strains on the EU budget, especially in the wake of the accession of new members. The annual
agricultural budget (around 40 billion euro) still comprises half of the total EU budget, and it will
increase by more than 10 per cent  once the new proposals are implemented in full. Furthermore,
if world prices remain as low as in 1998 or 1999, there will be an additional 2-3 billion to be
spent on export subsidies. Not surprisingly, ministers of finance of EU member states often call
for stabilization of the agricultural budget at pre-reform level, and it seems unlikely that EU
consumers will be willing to continue paying these vast sums indefinitely.
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It seems inevitable that the CAP will have to proceed towards further trade liberalization
and decoupling of support. The CAP will have to substitute the publicly funded farm income
support by rewards for services for which the consumer can pay indirectly, through the price of
labeled products that meet consumer concerns, or directly, through entrance fees in parks, or as
tax payers, via a contribution to landscape preservation. At the same time, farmers will have to
pay for environmental damages caused. In such a setting, the countryside becomes much more
than a producer of raw materials, and offers a variety of alternatives to agricultural employment.
This asks for a re-assessment of the system of area and headage premiums the CAP currently is
handing out as well as of the environmental constraints, say, with respect to manure, that are
being imposed.
Within this perspective, the premiums become rewards for services that are linked to the
mode of production of the farm. In this way, production characteristics such as animal welfare
and preservation of rural life and natural amenities can receive their remuneration. This goes
beyond the “cross-compliance” requirements proposed in Agenda 2000 (according to which
farmers also comply with environmental objectives in return for payments received, see CEC,
1998a) and calls for explicit and independent assessments of the contributions made and the
damages caused by a given farm operation. Like for restaurants, assessors could provide grades to
farms, which the processing industry can subsequently report on its labels. While it should be
acknowledged that the attractiveness for tourism differs strongly across regions, the system can
also benefit areas that are less favored in terms of productivity and landscape. In highly
productive areas, the relevant issue is more to guarantee that environmental standards, say,
regarding the pollution of groundwater, are being respected than to generate additional income
from tourism. Other, less attractive areas are highly urbanized already. There the challenge will
often be to distribute fairly the gains from appreciation of land values. This leaves the regions of
moderate to low productivity, of low population density and limited attractiveness. These will
require investments to maintain sufficient social infrastructure (roads, schools, and hospitals in
remote areas), possibly supplemented by retirement aid to farmers who cannot find a successor.
Clearly multi-functionality is not a panacea that relieves the EU and national government from its
responsibilities for maintaining viable conditions in rural areas. Nonetheless, by seeing to it that
every region capable of earning sufficient revenue from the market no longer relies on
government support, more funds are left for the less favored regions. The approach also allows to
reward more directly the rural amenities that are being appreciated most highly, and since these
proceeds do not fall with increased imports, it reduces the farmers’ vulnerability to foreign
competition. Most importantly, since multi-functionality payments can be viewed as a regular
reward for services delivered, they should qualify relatively easily as Green Box measures. And if
they are effectuated, the system can yield income to the farmers in EU and other OECD
countries, reduce their dependence on price support and soften their opposition to further trade
liberalization.
Reduction of sugar quotas
So far, the European sugar sector has managed to stay clear of all previous reforms of the CAP.
Sugar prices have even risen in nominal terms since the early eighties and are in 1999 still at 98
per cent of their 1987 level, while other crops had to endure severe price cuts that were only in
part compensated by area premiums. One of the outstanding peculiarities of this sector is its
discontinuity in supply response, which is mainly due to the lumpiness of sugar factories and the
technical impossibility of transporting sugar beets over longer distances. Sugar prices can
fluctuate relatively widely until they trigger a supply reaction but when they do the reaction is
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dramatic. As these characteristics apply to all sugar beet production and largely to sugarcane as
well, most countries tend to regulate their sugar markets relatively tightly (FAO, 1998a).
Developing countries are no exception.
The CAP effectuates its sugar policy through a quota-system for sugar beet production,
combined with a prohibitive tariff on non-preferential imports of refined (white) and raw sugar.
All sugar imports originate from the Lomé countries (and India) which enjoy preferential (almost
tariff free) access to the EU and thus depend on the CAP for their revenue. The distribution of
quotas among ACP-countries is highly skewed in favor of Mauritius and Fiji, as can be seen from
Table 15.
Table 15.   ACP preferential sugar import quotas in white sugar equivalents and revenues, 1995/’96
ACP country Sugar quotas
(1000 ton )
Value of sugar quotas
(mln euro)
Per capita value of
quotas (euro)
Barbados 50.3 17.1 64.2
Belize 40.3 13.7 63.4
Fiji 165.3 56.1 72.4
Guyana 159.4 54.1 56.0
Jamaica 118.7 40.3 16.1
Malawi 20.8 7.1 0.7
Mauritius 491.0 166.7 151.6
St Christopher and Nevis 15.6 5.3 129.2
Swaziland 117.8 40.0 44.4
Tobago 43.8 14.9 11.4
Zimbabwe 30.2 10.3 0.9
Congo 10.2 3.5 1.3
Côte d’Ivoire 10.2 3.5 0.2
Madagascar 10.8 3.7 0.3
Tanzania 10.2 3.5 0.1
India 10.0 3.4 ---
  Total 1304.6 443.0 5.1
Source:  Agra-Europe for quotas and World Bank (1998b) for population data.
Note: Only the duty free import quotas are presented here. Level of quotas and the guaranteed import price hold from 1995
until to date (India is excluded from per capita figures). The value of the quotas is measured as the difference between the
EU intervention price (646.5 euro/ton) and the white sugar world market price (306.9 euro/ton) times the sugar quotas, using
1995/’96 price data.
To regulate the domestic market, the European Commission specifies an intervention price
for white sugar and, based on the former, a basic price for sugar beets. Processing factories in
member states are assigned A- and B-quota for which they should pay farmers at least a specified
minimum price.28 For the European Union as a whole, the total of A- and B-quotas and ACP-
imports exceeds EU consumption and the surplus is exported with subsidy. Quota free C-sugar is
also sold on the world market but without subsidy. The Commission pays the difference between
the world market price and the intervention price and subsequently charges the sugar industry for
these export refunds (except for the re-export of sugar from ACP-countries which is paid from aid
and the C-sugar which receives no subsidy). Thus, the system is self-financing with respect to
export refunds. The necessary proceeds are collected through a producer levy. After deduction of
                                                
28 For A-beets this minimum price is 98 per cent of the basic price and the minimum price for B-beets is 60.5 per
cent of the basic price. In Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain producers receive an average price
for their sugar, whatever their A-, B-quotas, or possible production in excess of these quotas (C-sugar).
Producers in other countries receive a different price for the three types of sugar. Therefore, the marginal return
to the farmer varies considerably across member states.
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this levy, the sugar factories generally keep about forty per cent of the remaining production
value, and channel about sixty per cent to the farmers.
A reform of the sugar regime would start with a reduction of the intervention price. This
reduction would be transmitted to factories and, through these, to the farmer. The self-financing
nature of the regime has some cushioning effects, since the price reduction will also lead to a
reduction in export subsidies, and hence in producer levies. More importantly, under a price
reform, several sugar factories in the EU are likely to face bankruptcy, and consequently, output
will be reduced, as sugar will no longer be produced in the region around these factories.
Hence, a possible reform could operate along two lines. The first would be to reduce the
CAP price and let the sector itself absorb the shock. Some factories would go out of business and
consequently sugar output and EU exports would drop. But it would take a severe price cut until
the EU becomes a net importer. The second line of reform would be to abstain from any severe
price cut and only reduce the production quotas. This would still leave the allocation of the
remaining production quotas among EU-members to be decided upon, and as an alternative to a
discretionary assignment the factories could auction the quotas among themselves. This could be
combined with an increase in the volume of preferential imports, which themselves leave a choice
between allocation of fixed import quotas to beneficiaries (ACP-countries or others) and
organizing an auction whose proceeds could be earmarked for development assistance.
To highlight the possibly significant implications of such alternatives, we conducted a
simple numerical exercise. Based on quantity and price data for 1996/’97, Table 16 shows how
different reforms might affect the sugar exports of ACP-countries. The table distinguishes a base
case and three variants. The first variant reduces the CAP intervention price by a modest 10 per
cent,  but cuts into the EU production quotas so as to eliminate all subsidized exports. The second
variant, “Improved Access”, goes one step further with quota reduction until it reaches 70 per
cent of domestic utilization. ACP countries are given the opportunity to supply the shortfall on
preferential terms. The third variant, “Full liberalization”, combines the quota reduction with a 40
per cent  reduction in the CAP price. This leads to a 250 per cent  increase in imports. Clearly the
white sugar price reductions affect the sugar beet price as well; since the net revenue per hectare
of sugar beet is on average twice as high as that of cereals and oilseeds, a substantial price
reduction will not make beet production disappear. Yet, since net revenues per hectare of sugar
beet differ widely over member states, pressure is building up to reallocate the quotas over
member states.
Table 16.    Sugar reform scenarios, EU-15
Value account Sugar production
(mln euro)
ACP preferences,
net (mln euro)
Sugar production,
variant / status quo
(%)
ACP preferences,
variant / status quo,
net (%)
Status quo 9035 514 -- --
Autarky 6939 404 -23 -21
Improved access 5110 1010 -43 +96
Full liberalization 3520 184 -61 -64
Note: net ACP preferences are computed as the difference between ACP sugar imports valued at intervention price and
valued at world market price. Status quo: Intervention price white sugar: 646.5 euro/t, world price 344 euro/t, producer
levies per unit 77 euro/t, Total sugar production 16.8 mln t, ACP imports 1.7 mln t, other imports 0.4 mln t, domestic
utilization 12.8 mln t. Data are based on 1996/97 figures. ACP imports consists of duty free imports as in Table 15 and the
special Preferential Sugar imports of 0.4 mln t which enter with a reduced duty. Autarky:  Intervention price –10%; sugar
production –25%, ACP imports unchanged. Improved access: Intervention price –10%; sugar production –46%, ACP
imports +250%. Full liberalization: Intervention price –40%, sugar production –46%, ACP imports +250%.
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The exercise suggests that sugar production quotas mus t be reduced significantly before
any room is created for additional imports. In the improved access variant the ACP-countries
enjoy substantially larger preferences in volume terms, and since the white sugar price falls only
slightly, their sugar preferences double in value.
The discussion is illustrative of some basic dilemmas of trade liberalization. Radical
measures would wipe out a large fraction of sugar production in the EU and would open markets
for exports by developing countries, most likely by efficient producers such as Brazil and
Thailand. Trade preferences would lose all their value and cause important adjustment problems
in some of the ACP-countries. Hence, this option is unlikely to pass. The alternative of extending
the preferential system admittedly generates new distortions in specialization in developing
countries and creates dependence on the EU. Similarly, auctioning the import quotas generates
significant revenue but it also causes dependence and amounts to a sharing of distortionary rents.
Be this as it may, all three options are to be preferred over the maintenance of the status quo, and
therefore deserve attention. 
Coherence
Summing up, through domestic reforms, possibly supported by foreign assistance, LDCs can
alleviate their current supply constraints in food and agriculture. But most of them will have to go
one step further and also develop agricultural exports, and for this they need better market access,
especially to the EU. In this respect the lack of coherence of developed countries’ policies is
striking. They profess the virtues of structural adjustment and trade liberalization through the
multilateral and bilateral aid channels, but maintain stern protectionism with respect to
agricultural imports, and only commit themselves to reductions in export subsidies and AMS,
while asking preservation of the Blue Box. Moreover, sugar stays clear of any CAP reform. It
would seem that the multi-functionality approach that rewards separately all services rendered by
farmers would make it easier for the EU to accept liberalization, and that with respect to sugar, a
production quota reduction would be acceptable more easily than a severe cut in price. A quota
reduction could also be used to mobilize aid funds, or to counter the erosion of preferences.
5.3 Access to courts
As discussed in Chapter 2, the record of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism is so far considered
to be satisfactory, except in the highly politicized Banana case. Nonetheless, several suggestions
for improvement were put forward recently (see South Centre, 1999a) that will be described in
this section. Distinction can be made between improvements in the multilateral mechanism, and
alternative court based systems.
Improvements of the multilateral procedure
Going to trial is costly, especially for developing countries. To reduce these costs, the WTO, with
the assistance of the World Bank, and jointly with a selected group of countries are now
organizing various support systems. The International Trade Centre in Geneva has been erected
to coordinate these efforts and to provide information and training to officials from developing
countries. The most recent initiative is the foundation of the ACWL (Advisory Centre on WTO
Law) with resources for financial assistance in dispute settlement cases on a cost-sharing basis
(ACWL, 1999).
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The Dispute Settlement procedure could be made less costly by including a “DS-light.”
Since trading volumes of developing countries are in most cases relatively small, there is a need
for a streamlined Dispute Settlement procedure for cases up to, say, one million US-dollar, with a
single panelist reviewing the process and completing it within three months (as suggested by
Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1999). This would meet LDC needs for a fast track procedure in small
cases that nonetheless concern a large share of their total exports. Of course, far more ambitious
proposals could be envisaged. One could be the development of the Appellate Body into a true
WTO-court, proposed in Hudec (1998). The WTO Secretariat could be extended with the position
of a special prosecutor, with the task of identifying possible violations of WTO commitments
through trade policy reviews, and even the power to initiate inquiries into the legality of recorded
measures, instead of only acting on complaints from member countries.
Clearly, a trial is only meaningful if the verdict is enforced eventually. So far, the
GATT/WTO process has through the Dispute Settlement made the transition from consensus
based to rule based decision making. Lacking is, however, a strong rule enforcement mechanism.
WTO decisions are said to be binding, but they only tell who is right and who is wrong. No
compensation is given to the claimant, the perpetrator has no fine to pay and can delay the
implementation of the decisions by just doing something without changing the actual policy
substantially. In short, to keep the dispute settlement mechanism effective it would need
sanctions. It might also need an independent prosecutor. However, all these would require
countries to surrender a large part of their sovereignty to a non-elected international body, and is
therefore unlikely to be acceptable.
Access to national courts
The alternative would be to refer the judicial tasks to where they usually belong, that is to
national courts. Whatever the direction in which it is being extended, the DSU of the WTO is
only open to governments. Traders have to convince their government that their concerns are
sufficiently important to warrant their attention, and eventually bring their cases to the DSU. For
the trader the lobbying cost will be high but in addition, the government will often have many
reasons to abstain from any action, to avoid deterioration of the relations with the country that is
being accused, which will often be a donor if the exporter is a LDC. If exporters had access to the
courts of the importing country they could file a case against government authorities that fail to
comply with WTO regulations. They could also ask for compensation of damages, and the
enforcement procedures would be simple as well. In case of joint ventures with traders or
manufacturers from the developing country the situation would even be easier, since the locally
based firm could take care of the legal proceedings.
The reason for this being impossible at present is that one critical legal link is still missing
between WTO law and national legislation. LNV-BZ (1996) and Keyzer and Merbis (1997)
propose to create the link and Hoekman and Mavroidis (1999) distinguish three possible ways of
doing so. The first is for a national government to declare by law that the WTO regulation (or any
other international agreement) is to have ‘direct effect’. This means that private litigants are
allowed to raise relevant points of WTO (international public) law before national courts.
Currently, GATT rules have no direct effect in national legal order of the US and the EU.29 A
second option is to pass implementing legislation that gives private parties a basis to sue their
                                                
29 The European Court of Justice refused to examine the compatibility of the EU’s banana regime with its WTO
obligations. The US Court of Appeals accepts the argument that domestic statutes prevail over GATT law. One
can only agree with Tumlir (1985) who calls this a crucial weakness of the multilateral trade system.
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governments for non-compliance with WTO obligations. This is also considered a far-reaching
step, since once started it paves the way to other international agreements as well to become
national law. The third option is to create “challenging” mechanisms. Private parties are allowed
to challenge WTO inconsistent behavior by government entities before domestic courts, without
saying anything on the issue of direct effect. This has happened at WTO level in the Agreement
on Government Procurement (see Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1997).
It may be useful to add that the decision of granting access to domestic courts does not
have to be generic. Individual countries always keep the right to refuse it. However, it can be
expected that foreign investors will more easily be attracted if the country offers adequate
opportunities to challenge its decisions in court. Indeed countries already compete in fields as
diverse as the tax, labor, and property rights legislation. Trade legislation will join soon.
Moreover, it is in the particular interest of countries that belong to a larger regional grouping such
as the EU or Mercosur to take the initiative, and pass the legislation before the other members do.
This will not only help them gain an edge over the other members by making their general
environment more favorable for investments, but bring direct revenue as the provision of the legal
services themselves is usually very attractive.
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Chapter 6
New issues
Until the Uruguay round, the establishment of free markets for all internationally traded
commodities was the main purpose of negotiation, hence the emphasis on tariffication of all trade
related measures and subsequent reductions of these tariffs. Though this element continues to
play an important role, the awareness has been growing that trade is intimately interwoven with
the domestic economy and that recent technical change and transformations in the industrial
organization have fundamentally changed the picture and the basic interests of the participants. In
this chapter we review some of the issues.
Theoretically, the virtues of free trade are relatively clear. As argued by Johnson (1967a),
whatever the reason for world prices being what they are, for a small country that has to take
these as given there is no incentive to impose any tariffs, since these merely distort the price
signals received by its producers and consumers at home. At the same time, if in this country
consumer preferences and technologies satisfy the standard conditions, the country has no interest
in imposing excise taxes on domestic production or in letting any domestic price deviate from its
competitive world market level.
This raises two questions, first, what to do on the food markets, or more generally in the field
of trade if the country is unable to implement the first-best policy in some sphere, and, secondly,
how to deal with cases that do not meet the standard requirements. As regards the first question,
underdevelopment is often characterized by market failure of various kinds. The lack of
infrastructure may lead to deficiencies in procedures for product grading which results in “rough”
markets that are unable to differentiate between various qualities and therefore not conducive to
the supply of high quality. For several products markets may be missing altogether or highly
monopolized. Furthermore, crucial government tasks commonly have to be financed largely from
the proceeds of tariffs on imports or from export taxes. In the presence of such imperfections, a
reduction in border protection might fail to create a welfare improvement. Finally, developing
country governments often find it difficult to tax directly the profits of large multi-national and
other corporations that operate within their borders and may have monopoly power on some
domestic markets. In such cases tariffs and excises offer second-best alternatives.
These are typically the grounds advanced by governments in developing countries to
underpin their claim for exemptions. The common reaction is that openness in trade is good for
growth (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997), because it operates as a strong disciplining
mechanism by reducing the power of local monopolists and other rent seekers, and allows
importing the very services required for the improvement of grading procedures and market
infrastructure. As to the argument for tariffs as an indispensable source of government revenue, a
tax reform is often proposed to substitute for the loss in tariff revenue resulting from
liberalization by means of direct taxation, or a tax on consumption. In short, the argument that
domestic imperfections can justify protection no longer carries much weight. However, there are
other cases for accepting regulation of trade, which are generally advocated on grounds of
specificity, and of not meeting the standard assumptions that justify free trade. In this chapter we
distinguish two groups of issues.
The first relates to regionalization. For various, partly institutional reasons, a free trade
among neighboring countries within a region may offer specific advantages. The expanding
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membership of the EU is illustrative of this trend. Conclusion of a free trade agreement among
neighboring states can be conducive to peace, and often generates economies of scale in
infrastructure (transport, health, education) as well as in the diplomatic and commercial
representation abroad (e.g. in Geneva or Brussels). At the same time, regional free trade
agreements generally erect new barriers to trade with outsiders, causing a trade diversion which is
all the more detrimental when a region consists of countries with relatively similar endowment
proportions, as potential gains from trade tend to become larger when these proportions differ.
The second group of issues concerns the structural changes in the international economy 
due to both stronger product differentiation and higher knowledge intensity of products. Food
products tend to become ever more differentiated, partly as a result of the preferences for variety
on the part of richer consumers and their demand for more processed foods, partly due to their
concerns about food safety and moral aspects of agricultural production (environment, animal
welfare, labor standards). This weakens the position of raw material producers and creates rents
on the end product that may eventually become more significant than any tariff levied on the raw
material in the past. Regarding knowledge intensity, the intimate relationship between trade,
foreign investment and transfer of knowledge has to be accounted for in its various ramifications.
Knowledge creation has to be rewarded and requires adequate protection of intellectual property
rights. Knowledge use is to a large extent non-rival (“like light, it shines on all”, see World Bank
1998a), and hence cannot be managed efficiently on an unregulated free market because of free
riding. Furthermore, access to knowledge no longer is the exclusive domain of education and
extension agencies, since it extends beyond dissemination and increasingly requires active
participation in production processes. The next sections deal with these issues in more detail.
6.1 Regionalization
Whether regionalization actually brings benefits to developing countries remains a hotly disputed
subject. Regionalization often takes the institutional form of a preferential trade agreement (PTA)
among neighboring countries. In some cases the PTA is little more than a barter agreement
between governments but increasingly, PTAs are set up that are intended to develop into true
customs unions (Mercosur, APEC, COMESA). Bhagwati (1993), Bhagwati et al. (1998) and
Srinivasan (1998) view PTAs as ‘stumbling blocks’ to multilateral liberalization, which slow
down development since they divert imports from the most efficient producers and distort the
domestic specialization. On the other hand, Lawrence (1996), Frankel (1997), and Ethier (1998)
view the same PTAs as ‘stepping stones’ towards free trade. These enable developing countries to
open up for trade, at first with competitors within the same region, who often share similar cost
structures and will therefore allow to pursue domestic production. Collier and Gunning (1995)
argue that by their international nature PTAs tend to strengthen the commitment to policy reform
and to provide a more stable and secure policy environment, which is conducive to foreign direct
investments. Be this as it may, most authors agree that since in the multilateral perspective to
trade liberalization, all preferences should vanish eventually, the PTAs are to be seen as no more
than stepping stones and thus as transient phenomena that do not deserve elaborate institutional
embedding. However, they might also become stumbling blocks because they enable the major
trading blocks to keep all options open. These blocks can dismantle the PTAs if trade
liberalization is a success but can always resort to managed trade in case it fails (Krugman, 1990).
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REPAs under a new Lomé agreement
The current policy of the EU adds a new dimension to the debate on regionalization because the
EU has decided to promote the creation of regional blocks in developing countries. Its current
mandate for negotiations with ACP-countries (CEC, 1997c) specifies that the earlier set of Lomé
countries should be redefined and split into regional groupings, which, however, may exist of one
country only. This would seem to be at odds with the EU’s stated goals (CEC, 1997a) of
promoting free trade but even the current WTO-treaty allows for such arrangements, provided
they are temporary and reciprocal. In fact, the EU intends to channel all its bilateral development
aid to regional groupings. The regional agreements with the EU will all take the form of a
Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (REPA). The REPA includes both trade, aid and
cooperation aspects. Trade is regulated through an (interregional) PTA between the EU and the
region concerned. Essentially the EU grants preferential tariff quotas to the countries of the
region, who start liberalizing their mutual trade while establishing a rule for sharing the tariff
proceeds to ensure that, say, landlocked members benefit fairly. Though the PTAs claim to define
reciprocal access so as to meet WTO requirements, this access is necessarily heavily restricted by
quotas (Davenport et al., 1995; Tangermann, 1997; Duponcel, 1998). Under a more free access
the EU markets could become flooded with imports and the CAP would be incapacitated, or
conversely the EU might dump its surpluses in the region, since the price would presumably be
higher there than on the world market. Through these REPAs, the EU seeks to maintain the
possibility of limiting its trade preferences exclusively to the group of ACP countries only, which
conflicts in principle with the General System of Preferences.
Mercosur
Through the 1991 treaty of Asuncion, the Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and
Uruguay) went a long way in creating a customs union. They established a common external
tariff and proclaimed that internal free trade should be effective by 2005. So far, some sensitive
products such as sugar and automobiles are still protected by higher tariffs but the harmonization
of external tariffs has been substantial (Laird, 1997), although the rates differ among sectors
(Olarreaga and Soloaga, 1998).
This agreement offers a good illustration of the controversies around the issue of
regionalization that would also be of relevance for Africa. Whereas in the eighties GDP growth in
the Mercosur countries was a mere one per cent  per annum, in the period 1991-1995 growth
accelerated to 3.8 per cent, and internal trade surged. Whether this was a matter of trade diversion
remains unclear. Yeats (1998) argues that external trade did not rise, but Nagarajan (1998)
concludes differently, and both refer to a period before mid-1997 when at the onset of the East
Asia crisis Mercosur decided to raise its external tariff on thousands of items by 25 per cent. 
Recently, Mercosur announced that it would again reduce its external tariff and expand its
membership and international linkages. Both the US and the EU expressed their interest in
association and possibly free-trade agreements with Mercosur, evidently allured by the large and
strongly growing consumer markets. In practice, enlargement proves difficult to accomplish, even
with neighbors at a similar stage of development. Chile has been admitted as associate member,
but failed in its attempts at being upgraded to full member. Negotiations with the Andean group
were unsuccessful. Deals with the US floundered and so did the attempts at far more ambitious
projects such as the establishment of a free trade zone for the entire hemisphere (known as the
FTAA, see Lee, 1995 and FTAA, 1999). Similarly, a deal with the EU was halted because it,
quite obviously, proved incompatible with the CAP. Mercosur has large export potentials and is
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known to be a low cost producer for products such as cereals and beef. It is no surprise therefore,
that the EU agricultural ministers eventually blocked the negotiations on a free trade deal with
Chile and Mercosur (Agra-Europe, August 1997).
In sum, the basic logical problem of all PTAs is that they cannot at the same time be
concluded between any large pair of trading blocks, be significant, and leave both customs unions
unaffected. Therefore, regional agreements are unlikely to achieve multilateral trade liberalization
via the route of PTA-interlinkage. The Mercosur experience also illustrates the vulnerability of
PTAs. The agreement almost broke down when Brazil devalued its currency and Argentina
increased import tariffs on Brazilian goods. African PTAs would, with their strong export
orientation on raw commodities, be even more vulnerable to external shocks.
6.2 New economy related issues
6.2.1 Product differentiation: consumer concerns and vertical integration
Consumers in developed countries increasingly demand highly differentiated, processed food
products, composed of ingredients that often originate from all over the world. This trend has
important implications for developing countries. As these diversified products necessarily carry
labels as end-product, the foreign suppliers of the ingredients do not share in the rent from
product differentiation, unless they participate in the brand, and this reinforces the dominance of
the final, marketing and processing parts of the chain. Product differentiation generally results
from specific consumer concerns and from technological innovation.
Consumer concerns
Consumer concerns commonly relate to product safety and to moral aspects of the production
process. As regards safety, the recent BSE-crisis for beef in the EU was a case in point. Changes
in technology and the growing interdependence among farms (i.e. feeding ruminants with animal
proteins) has allowed the mad cow disease to spread. Medical research established a link between
BSE and the fatal Creutzfeldt-Jacob syndrome in humans. Government authorities established
regulations whereby the feeding of animal proteins is being prohibited and every cow can be
followed from stable to table. Yet, cases of fraud were detected. Consequently, supermarket
chains are looking for ways to establish their own labels and product quality control,
implemented through direct contracts with farmers whose feeding practices and livestock trade
are being controlled very tightly. Similar developments take place in other branches of the
livestock sector (e.g. in the Dutch pork industry, Den Ouden et al., 1994).
In addition, consumers have developed stronger sensitivity to moral aspects related to the
mode of production. These include environmental concerns as well as the treatment of workers
and animals in the production process (Barkema, 1993; Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn, 1996). The
general approach so far taken by the WTO in this respect is that the WTO itself is only concerned
with the physical characteristics. The WTO emphasizes that non-discrimination principles apply
to all products with the same physical characteristics, independently of the mode of production.
The WTO acknowledges the importance of consumer concerns but it takes the position that
the best approach for dealing with these is to let countries sign separate agreements on such
matters. The WTO can contribute its long-standing experience in arriving at international trade
agreements, and once the agreement has been signed the full WTO-machinery for dispute
settlement might be used. But the WTO is not involved at the substantive level and, moreover,
such a treaty cannot be binding on non-signatories. Product labeling can be applied to inform the
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consumer about the characteristics, as long as aspects pertaining to the mode of production have
not been regulated through international treaties. Through labeling, national authorities can
require all importers to indicate the physical content and the safety properties. Even if
requirements pertaining to a description of the mode of production are banned by WTO,
competition will gradually create a differentiation between labeled and unlabeled production that
will reflect in prices.
Vertical integration
As consumers attribute higher priority to qualities, retailers also become more eager to offer a
guarantee, which in turn requires some form of control. This leads to vertical integration. For
some products, such as meat, this implies tight vertical coordination while for others, such as
vintage wines, it has so far been possible to “seal” the product and “freeze” its qualities before it
leaves the farm or the region of origin. The trend is also favorable for ecological farming, which
relies less heavily on purchased inputs.
When international food trade becomes freer, agribusiness soon finds it profitable to
outsource much of its raw material production to countries with cheap labor and ample land
resources, where farmers are satisfied with lower incomes and agriculture can be less intensive.
Why raise pigs in overpopulated areas of the EU where environmental costs are being charged in
full, if it is possible to produce them cheaper elsewhere? Even in the absence of perfectly free
trade, the preferential trade agreements of the EU would provide focus areas for the European
food industry to penetrate both in terms of market outlets and outsourcing. This creates new
opportunities for some developing countries. While it requires some form of vertical
coordination, as all segments of the chain have to fit very tightly, full vertical integration from
farm to retail is not necessarily the outcome, as the chain might consist of separate firms (Porter,
1985; Perry, 1989). 
The classic image of a food market consists of farmers coming with their fresh products,
pricing by grade and buyers shopping around and buying from the producer with best price-for-
quality. This horizontal representation has various weaknesses of its own (Kirman, 1992).
However, in a world of super-markets and franchises, the main shortcoming is presumably that it
abstracts from the many transactions that must be completed along the chain until the retail level
is reached. The informational requirements can become so imposing that it is impossible to fulfil
them under the perfectly competitive conditions of anonymous buyers and sellers. For the buyer,
the seller’s reputation becomes important, which the seller on his part will be more eager to make
true in a long-standing relationship than in casual trade. In short, more vertical integration means
a steady trend towards less anonymity of suppliers, more long-term contracts, and possibly joint
ownership of various segments of the chain.
6.2.2 Knowledge, intellectual property rights, and imperfect competition
Besides changes in consumer preferences, the process of technological innovation itself has
important structural effects on agricultural markets as well. Earlier analysis viewed this progress
as a shifter that should not fundamentally change the functioning of the economy. Gradually
theorists have come to acknowledge its far-reaching implications, and the topic has gained a
prominent position in several branches of economics, including industrial organization, trade
theory, growth theory, and contract theory. Here we can only tentatively sketch some salient
phenomena and their possible implications.
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Modularity, dematerialization, networks, standards
One phenomenon is occasionally referred to as modularity (Bradford, 1994; Dahlman, 1994;
Reed, 1996). To save on stocks and to maintain flexibility in design, distinct suppliers
increasingly produce to order components with very definite characteristics that all perfectly fit
together. The major challenge in management of the whole production system is to achieve
constant quality and configuration, and timely delivery of every part. Nonetheless, despite this
specialization, and much like living organisms, industrial plants tend to differ less in their
physical constitution than in their organization. They essentially consist of the same basic parts
(control screens, robots, sensors, climate control etc.) which are only programmed differently.
This greatly improves the flexibility of the capital good producing sectors, and the economies of
scale they can achieve.
Another ongoing trend is known as dematerialization (Soete and ter Weel, 1999). New chip
controlled equipment is made of lighter materials and much smaller than the bulky wheelworks it
replaces. PC’s substitute for mainframes and their air conditioned environments with
sophisticated power supply. Cellular phones allow for wireless long distance connections.
Developing countries typically gain from this type of change as they do from advances in
medicine and bio-technology that were originally geared to serve the developed country markets,
but have produced knowledge and products (e.g. seeds and vaccines) that benefit developing
countries. This is the aspect “Knowledge is light” as emphasized in the 1998 World Development
Report (World Bank, 1998a). Typically, the process is being characterized by high outlays on
R&D, followed by low and relatively constant cost of actual manufacturing.
Thus, two opposing forces can be discerned. On the one hand, the educational requirements
for using high tech devices are falling. Anyone can use a cellular phone and this makes it possible
to produce these devices on a very large scale, and at low cost. On the other hand the skills to
produce high tech become ever more specialized in terms of both the degree of sophistication of
the new device itself and the requirement to let it meet all the industry standards. These standards
reach far beyond restrictions on physical characteristics, safety, and mode of production.
In fact, setting the standard has become the name of the game (Matutes and Regibeau,
1996). This calls not only for technical skills in designing new products but also for legal
dexterity, aggressiveness in marketing and shrewdness in acquisition of potential competitors. In
the past any country able to produce good quality paddy or sugarcane could accede the world
market and elaborate import barriers were needed to protect domestic producers. In the world of
high tech, participation has become much more of a social undertaking, which requires access to
networks rather than to markets. These networks have a definite packing order, and distribute
privileged knowledge to their inner circle and lease less privileged information to outside
customers under the protection of patents, licenses, franchises and other intellectual property
rights (IPRs).
Setup costs and imperfect competition
Theorists of the industrial organization and new trade schools (e.g. Krugman, 1990) generally
conclude from this that the sector is characterized by increasing returns, with the R&D
expenditures as setup or fixed cost and the manufacturing costs as variable costs. In this view, the
“new” economy operates in a way that is qualitatively different from that of the individual cells
of the idealized competitive market where individuals and firms only communicate via prices.
For theoretical research conducted in this tradition, the challenge is no longer to design general
policy guidelines. It is rather to describe the intricacies of interactions among agents who decide
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under conditions of imperfect and unevenly distributed information (Besen and Farrell, 1994;
Katz, 1986; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Veugelers, 1998). The approach was also welcomed in
applied models, where incorporation of setup costs and markup pricing allowed to generate much
stronger gains, through the increase in sales that trade liberalization allowed to achieve (DeVault,
1996; Dixit, 1984; Kielbasa and Konopielko, 1997). These gains may have contributed a great
deal to the popularity of this type of model, as they provided an additional argument in favor of
trade liberalization.
However, once it is accepted that economies characterized by large R&D outlays have
increasing returns to scale, it becomes natural to question the virtues of perfect competition itself
and hence of free trade. Indeed, if variable costs are constant and small and setup costs are high,
imperfect competition is almost the only way for producers to make a profit with prices above
marginal costs, through restricting output and deterring entrants. If other producers could simply
copy the invention, their unrestricted entering of the market would drive the price down to the
level of the direct costs, and the inventor would not recover his R&D costs and possibly socially
desirable goods would not be produced. Hence, the conclusion is that imperfect competition
should be tolerated and intellectual property rights protected to avoid copying. The alternative
would be to cover the cost of R&D from the public budget. However, this is not a practical
suggestion because the decision to engage in a particular R&D outlay is generally a discrete one.
It involves large sums of money, and the central planner would find it very difficult to select
profitable projects, since their impact would be so large that prices are affected. In short, by
treating R&D outlays as lumpy decisions, one introduces a non-convexity that undermines
decentralizability through competitive markets and may require subsidies to recover these
outlays.
This raises the concern that companies might use vertical integration not only to recover
their R&D costs, but also to extract monopoly rents, thereby distorting market prices. This in turn
means that trade liberalization becomes questionable, since in a second best world it deprives the
government of the use of tariffs to correct for the distortions caused by monopolies. Such optimal
tariffs might not only be required on the market with monopoly but could permeate throughout
the economy. Clearly, when taken to its extreme, treating R&D outlays as large setup costs could
have devastating effects on the credibility of the entire WTO-project.
Recovering the cost of R&D
It is possible to maintain a less radical position because the setup cost approach has several
important limitations. The very fact that R&D outlays precede the actual manufacturing does not
mean that they should necessarily be represented as fixed costs, since in an intertemporal context
all expenditures become variable. The relevant issue is whether they are “seriously” lumpy. The
qualification “seriously” is needed here because lumpiness is prevalent in every production
process, as machines, books or spare parts are necessarily indivisible. The critical factor is
whether the indivisibility is large relative to the variations in the demand for the product. In some
of the most high tech sectors it might well be the case that R&D has to reach a very high critical
mass before it becomes effective, but one could argue that on global markets indivisibilities are of
lesser significance. Moreover, outside the military the R&D organizations rarely engage in single
product design and increasingly operate through networks of variable configuration. In sum, the
empirical evidence for the production technology of knowledge being specifically lumpy is often
anecdotal (FTC, 1996).
Nonetheless, even if one accepts lumpiness as a fundamental characteristic of R&D, this
does not warrant the conclusion that governments should tolerate unregulated monopolies.
62
Through its focus on the setup cost (i.e. on the non-convexity in production) the new trade
literature focuses on supply and tends to neglect the demand side of knowledge. If one accepts the
view that R&D production is to be seen as a production process that is, like crop production,
characterized by yield variability, and possibly non-convex input response, then excludability
from the outputs of R&D becomes the real issue to be addressed. Characterizing knowledge as
light, means that it acts as a non-rival input and, like for any input of this nature, the user should
be charged a price equal to the marginal productivity of this input in his production process
(Lindahl pricing). Free markets admittedly have a poor record in their ability to determine such
prices but private firms generally have little difficulty in performing this task internally among
various departments, and indeed this is one of the main reasons of their existence. The walls of
the firm restore excludability, through secrecy. Patents, licenses and other IPRs can have a similar
effect. Moreover, the problems of non-rivalry largely emanate from the assumed perfect jointness
of the production process. In practice, the transformation to operational knowledge is expensive,
since teachers, consultants and training courses have to be provided for and a market for
knowledge dissemination can develop.
Yet a high R&D intensity will induce companies to form conglomerates, as size becomes a
way of internalizing the excludability problem within one large firm, as opposed to a means of
influencing the output price. Because this conglomerate is also engaged in using and
disseminating the fruits of its R&D, possibly under decreasing returns, the set-up costs of its
R&D become a smaller part of its total costs, and it might be able to operate without losses even
under competitive conditions. However, the members of the conglomerate might now try to
extend their cooperation in order to raise the price, but several countervailing forces can be
identified. First, the product itself will usually have substitutes. Second, the firm may find it
profitable to raise its profits by issuing licenses to potential entrants. This will reduce the unit
profit and if the license has substitutes on the market its price will also be contained. Finally, the
shareholders or customers might resist monopolistic practices if these are harmful to them. They
can do so through direct pressure or by threatening the firm’s reputation. If these powers fail,
government and the WTO have a task to perform.
The implications are that Intellectual Property Rights are to be protected, and that vertical
integration through mergers may improve social welfare if they allow for better Lindahl pricing,
but that monopoly pricing is not to be tolerated (see also Keyzer and Van Wesenbeeck, 1999). At
national level, this implies that strong anti-trust legislation is needed, in line with the current
developments in competition policy within the EU and the US (FTC, 1996). Internationally, there
is still a missing link since international competition policy is lacking (Jacquemin, 1995; Keyzer,
1998; WTO/EU, 1999). Yet, proposals for an international competition policy are being launched
(Hoekman and Holmes, 1999; Scherer, 1994), while a number of countries are already
concluding bilateral treaties on this subject. The implementation of international anti-trust
legislation would in particular benefit developing countries that lack the resources to enforce such
policy at the national level.
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Chapter 7
The stakes for Ethiopia
7.1 Position of Ethiopia regarding WTO
According to Ethiopian representatives, the country’s main problem with respect to its
international trade is the country’s limited supply capacity, although a lack of access to
international markets is important as well. The representatives also notice that the liberalization
policies of the past years were apparently unsuccessful in attracting foreign investments,
presumably due to lack of infrastructure, training and institutional capacity.
Ethiopia is currently participating in the WTO as an observer, and intends to apply for full
membership. It sees no large impediments to WTO membership, since it has already liberalized
its economy under guidance of World Bank and IMF, and its delegation in Geneva can handle the
WTO affairs. Access to the dispute settlement procedures of WTO is not considered a priority, as
these procedures are considered unfavorable for LDCs, as long as they remain insignificant
parties in international trade. According to the Ethiopian representatives, in the current situation,
LDCs are too weak and dependent and thus lack the bargaining power to be effective in the
dispute settlement procedures, for which they often also lack the legal capacity. Ethiopia fears
that it will, like other least developed countries, become marginalized in world trade. Especially
in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, economic growth is weak and vulnerable, and exports still
depend on few commodities. The share of these countries in world trade has fallen in recent
years.
To lift its supply constraints, investments are needed in the people of Ethiopia and in its
economic infrastructure, which according to these representatives should preferably be financed
by loans or grants from the World Bank and other international donors. Consequently, Ethiopia
sees the World Bank and the IMF as its main counterparts for discussions on its economic
development policy. The requirements imposed by them appear to be much stricter than the WTO
rules. For example, the World Bank and IMF did not approve of a continuation of the fertilizer
subsidy in Ethiopia, although WTO rules for developing countries allow this type of agricultural
input subsidies for poor farmers.
Ethiopia is not eager to discuss new topics in WTO negotiations, and would rather like to
see existing commitments for aid, as decided upon at WTO meetings in Marrakech and Singapore
or laid down in several UN resolutions, to be implemented. This would help lift its supply
constraints more than any new concept or initiative. It considers having fulfilled, through the
economic reforms, all its commitments to the international community, and now awaits the
community to reciprocate. Unfortunately, LDCs have so far not been able to organize any
concerted effort in this respect.
Ethiopia stresses that the Special and Differential Treatment of the LDCs are to be viewed
as an intrinsic part of WTO rules, and therefore the interests of these countries should not be
treated by exceptions to general rules only. For example, the transition periods in current WTO
rules for developing countries, LDCs in particular, are considered too short. They should not only
be made longer but also become dependent on the initial level of economic development of the
country. In the same spirit, protection of infant industries is considered necessary for the
development of new industries in Ethiopia, such as a textiles industry or a leather goods industry.
64
In this respect, Ethiopia sees possibilities for irrigated cotton cultivation in arid lowland areas,
which could feed to the domestic textiles industry. In its current development phase it needs
protection against the stiff competition especially from Asia but even within COMESA, since it
considers itself less developed than several other member countries.
Regarding the new trend of regionalization, Ethiopia argues that while regional cooperation
might generate benefits from larger markets and economies of scale, it should be based on mutual
interest between countries, and not imposed from outside. As long as countries are mainly
engaged in subsistence agriculture such cooperation will bring little gains from trade. Trade
requires transport infrastructure, illustrating once more that capacity constraints can dwarf all
attempts at participating in the world economy. Currently, Ethiopia and Djibouti have a mutual
interest in the port of Djibouti for international trade from and to Ethiopia. The regional
cooperation as proposed by the EU may be applicable in Southern Africa and West Africa, but in
East and Central Africa the conditions are not yet ripe. With respect to inter-regional cooperation,
it is noted that if LDCs obtain duty free access to the EU in 2005 as proposed currently, other
types of ‘free trade’ agreements with the EU become superfluous.
On the subject of consumer concerns, Ethiopia feels that the current phyto-sanitary
measures effectively work as non-tariff barriers on exports of livestock products. Importing
countries can unilaterally change their requirements to make them stricter than the prevailing
international standards. For example, the current requirements of the EU on disease control are
seen as excessive and far too sophisticated to be applied by Ethiopian farmers. To promote the
development of livestock production in the LDCs, the phyto-sanitary measures should become
more internationally standardized and LDCs should be assisted in overcoming their problems
with animal diseases. Nation-wide disease control is not seen as a practical goal in the short-term
for Ethiopia. A viable strategy for developing livestock production would be to start in a region
that is made and kept free from disease, and from which exports could be allowed. Once the
approach has proved successful in this region the area under disease control could be extended.
However, in the current situation it is very hard for Ethiopia to prove that exports are from a
disease free area. For the same reason, Saudi Arabia has temporarily banned imports of live
animals from Ethiopia because of an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in Kenya. Beyond the export
of livestock products Ethiopia sees export opportunities for naturally produced products, to meet
consumer demand in OECD countries for organic products. If it had the infrastructure, Ethiopia
could for example supply organic coffee but has not started developing its own brands for export
as organic food.
Finally, with respect to the issue of intellectual property rights, the TRIPS agreement
should be applied to items like computer programs, but not to food or seeds. The world’s
biodiversity should be used to increase food production. Over time, Ethiopia has substantially
contributed to the genetic resources held world wide, but never received any financial reward for
it.
Conclusions of Addis Ababa Workshop
At an international workshop held in November 1997 in Addis Ababa (Merbis et al., 1997b)
where the results of the background study for the present report were presented, representatives of
Ethiopia and other African countries expressed many similar concerns. The main conclusions of
the workshop were as follows.
(a) Lack of technology rather than international trade restric tions is the main problem of Sub-
Saharan Africa.
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(b) Domestic industry needs protection against exposure to international competition, and long
transition periods were recommended for LDCs.
(c) Country specific standards on labor and environment would hamper trade, and it is
recommended that international standards be developed and applied in a non-
discriminatory way to imports as well as to domestic production.
(d) A lack of sufficient international competition in the seed industry is detrimental to
developing countries.
(e) A loss of trade preferences would hurt LDCs.
(f) Regional cooperation is necessary to support common LDC interests in WTO negotiations.
(g) African countries need technical assistance to handle their WTO affairs.
An assessment
So far, this chapter reported on views and concerns expressed by representatives of Ethiopia and
other African countries. It reflected the general position that the new issues relating to WTO were
not in the interest of LDCs and should not detract attention from earlier unfulfilled aid
commitments and from the more basic issues of development. No trade without roads, no
productivity growth without literacy, no improvement in crop yields without good seeds, fertilizer
and irrigation. In short, development efforts should concentrate on their core business rather than
following every new fashion on the rich countries’ market. Another way of summarizing this is
simply “Don’t change the subject,” there is much business unfinished. Chapter 5 testified to that
effect.
In our view, this is an important message that deserves attention, but it has two layers. The
first is plainly that as long as the old, basic problems are not solved, it does not help to add new
issues to the list. The second layer is subtler. Throughout the developed world the life cycle of
products becomes ever shorter. Policy advice is no exception. Economists nowadays adapt their
views very quickly, partly to keep abreast with the newest developments in their field, partly to
avoid repeating themselves. This by itself is a form of dominance in the policy dialog with
developing countries that are not so closely connected to the opinion leaders. Hence the second
layer of  “Don’t change the subject” is that the countries in the North should not be given the
opportunity of dictating the agenda of negotiations. This holds especially as long as they fail to
fulfill earlier commitments, and much business is left unfinished, witness the protection of their
agricultural and labor markets.   
Nonetheless, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the relevance
of the issues raised in the two previous chapters. One justification is that whether or not the
subject is being changed is not for any LDC to decide, or for any particular group in the North for
that matter. It just seems to happen because the point is raised by some individual or simply
because structural changes naturally lead to it. The topics referred to in this report as “new” issues
fall in the latter category, and cannot be neglected. And yet they should not be allowed to
supersede the basic concerns of LDCs in the coming WTO round.
7.2 Dealing with unfinished business
Special and differential treatment. Like Ethiopia, other LDCs will presumably want international
attention to focus on supply constraints. For Ethiopia, an export oriented strategy naturally means
investing in the development of water resources through irrigation, possibly with Nile water, and
road construction. It requires foreign assistance to create grading systems, and joint ventures to
increase the processing value and to open the marketing channels. All this will make it possible to
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raise crop yields, to improve the health of livestock and let it produce better quality meat and
hides, and to plant fruit trees and other perennial crops. LDCs will want these subsidized
investments to be intensified, without WTO interfering because of AMS provisions or limits on
export subsidies. Meanwhile, development efforts cannot proceed in isolation. LDCs must look at
international markets.
Access to export markets. Initial successes in rural development will eventually be dwarfed by
insufficient access to export markets. Ethiopia would have to drive a very hard bargain to obtain,
like Namibia, any increase in beef export quota to the EU. Its prospects of acquiring any sugar
quota are bleak, unless the regime undergoes significant reform. Its fruits and vegetables can only
be exported to the EU under seasonal tariffs or tight seasonal quota restrictions. The reform of the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy as decided in April 1999 is mostly oriented to financial
problems of the EU itself, the accession of Central and Eastern European countries in the next
decade and the commitments made in the Uruguay Round Agreements. If this policy is
considered as the EU’s final bid in the coming WTO Millennium round, the least developed
countries have little to gain from it. Obviously, the current CAP rules conflict with the proposal
to give all LDCs unlimited duty free access to the EU markets, and the LDCs thus have a clear
interest in further CAP reform towards free international trade in agricultural commodities. In this
respect the application of the multi-functionality of agriculture within the EU, operates in their
favor as it makes it easier to increase access. Yet there is a clear conflict of interests among
LDCs, since those that belong to the ACP will like to see the CAP continued, and their
preferential quotas extended, keeping the others out. However important agricultural
development may be for the LDCs, the continuing relative decrease in the price of their
agricultural export products indicates that economic development has to include industrial
growth, for example by further processing of agricultural exports. For Ethiopia, the leather
industry, coffee processing and the textile industry might be candidates, and for this a reduction
of the tariff escalation for processed agricultural exports should become part of the WTO agenda.
 
Inflation. With respect to the erosion of commitments through inflation, developing countries
should seek to maintain maximum flexibility in their Schedules with respect to the currencies
they may use and the type of tariffs they invoke for notification purposes. If they became obliged
to notify in domestic currency, domestic inflation would presumably impose more severe
reduction requirements on AMS and export commitments than any WTO agreement ever could.
Access to courts. Finally, LDCs like Ethiopia refrain from engaging in dispute settlement
procedures of WTO because they find them too complex and fear, rightly or wrongly, that their
power is currently insufficient to win them. An improved access to courts, especially in Europe,
would greatly help them win the confidence that, once their own supply constraints are lifted, the
international community will welcome their participation in world trade.
7.3 New issues
Regionalization
Ethiopia’s objective interests in regional cooperation are relatively clear. First, since the country
is landlocked, it needs access to the seaports of Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, which can gain
from handling trade to and from Ethiopia. Secondly, as main source of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia
occupies a highly strategic position and downstream Sudan and Egypt definitely have an interest
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in friendly neighboring relations, as a possible Ethiopian decision to divert river waters for own
use might seriously affect their water supply. Finally, with all neighbors, Ethiopia has an interest
in containing contagious human as well as animal diseases. However, the current political
situation is not favorable for reaching closer regional cooperation. In Somalia, a central
government is still lacking and civil strife continues between several factions, and trade flows
through Berbera port are modest. In Sudan, the civil strife in the southern part bordering Ethiopia
has been lingering on for years. Currently, the relations with Eritrea are very tense due to a border
conflict resulting from its recent separation from Ethiopia in 1993, and other unsettled matters
relating to past debts. Consequently, trade between Ethiopia and Eritrea has come to a halt. It is
fortunate that Ethiopia’s relations with Djibouti remain excellent, and this city currently functions
as main port. The relations with Kenya are good as well but the country lies far away and also has
coffee as major export crop. Comparative advantages are therefore limited, and the long distances
make it difficult to derive any economies of scope from cooperation.
Officially, Ethiopia already cooperates with all its neighbors30 except Somalia, through the
COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa that aims at becoming a free
trade area in November 2000. It is unlikely that this ambitious goal can be reached by then for all
members, since for example Ethiopia is lagging behind in tariff reduction. It also remains unclear
how cooperation among COMESA members can be reconciled with other regional cooperation
agreements as envisaged by the EU. The COMESA initiative has certainly led to new trade flows
among its members, but free trade is still a distant aim and Ethiopia still asks for protection of its
own industry against imports from more developed industries in other member countries. Yet the
COMESA market might function as stepping stone towards competitiveness on the world market
and it is illustrative in this respect that Ethiopia recently imported cars assembled in Kenya, and
exported assembled television sets to Zimbabwe.
A new free trade agreement with the EU, successor of the Lomé Agreement, would mean
that industrial products from the EU acquire easier access to Ethiopia and other LDCs. This
conflicts with LDCs wishes for prolonged protection, to build up the own industrial sector. The
EU from its side wants to protect its agricultural sector, and to maintain its restrictions on imports
through quotas for the main CAP commodities (wheat, beef, and sugar) included in the minimum
access rules of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Under the present EU regulations, imports of
fruits and vegetables from Africa are severely restricted as well. If the African LDCs want to
continue protecting their domestic markets for manufacturing and services, and the EU its
agricultural and labor markets, there does not seem to be much room for any bilateral ‘free trade’
arrangement.
Consumer concerns and product differentiation
The concerns of consumers in OECD countries with respect to food safety and modes of
production concerning the environment, labor standards and animal welfare, offer new
opportunities to LDCs but these can only be effectuated if their specific constraints are duly
accounted for. Consumers concerns will stimulate government and private companies to
introduce new standards and labels, which guarantee that concerns are taken seriously. So far,
WTO has taken the position that standards should be established through separate international
                                                
30 The Nile River Initiative Secretariat opened in September, 1999, in Entebbe. Through this secretariat, Ethiopia
cooperates with Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda
in common pursuit of sustainable economic development and management of Nile waters. All these countries
are also members of COMESA.
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treaties. For each treaty the WTO has offered its dispute settlement mechanism as a vehicle to
deal with conflicts in implementation. Though WTO’s reluctance to extend its activities beyond
its current mandate seems understandable, this approach of wait and see shifts the burden of
coordination to the international forum at large. It might create a myriad of bilateral agreements,
standards and labels, and hamper exports from LDCs for whom the application of the
corresponding requirements is too sophisticated. One may recall in this connection that consumer
concerns originally addressed themselves to the highly intensified production methods in the
agricultural sector of OECD countries. It therefore seems ironic that they could eventually lead to
new restrictions on exports from developing countries such as Ethiopia, where fertilizer
application is low, agro-chemicals are hardly used, and livestock is raised in a natural way.
Consumer concerns might generate new non-tariff barriers against trade from developing
countries, just like the current phyto-sanitary standards, unless developing countries can ensure
the establishment and safeguard of common basic international standards. These should satisfy
the underlying consumer concerns but at the same time not be too demanding for developing
countries. It is also essential that transparent and fair rules be agreed upon for assigning the
burden of proof when their satisfaction is being challenged.
Obviously, a ‘fair trade’-label that explicitly aims to increase welfare of specific producers
in developing countries will channel benefits to its target group. Fair trade labels exist for coffee,
cocoa, and bananas but as their market shares remain small, the group of beneficiaries is also very
limited, and this creates a vertical product differentiation that may harm conventional producers.
‘Fair’ trade actually creates a specific form of vertical integration.
More generally, the trend towards vertical integration largely originates from developed
countries but it has potentially important implications on the trade relations between developed
and developing countries. It seems evident that the process of vertical integration causes a
fundamental change in the relationship between the farmer and the agribusiness, and strengthens
the hand of food importers relative to exporters, and this might be detrimental to least developed
countries.
Developing countries might attempt to enter the OECD markets with their own brands and
labels. They have at times been successful in this respect for fresh products such as vegetables
and fruits. Easiest to maintain are labels of origin (mangoes from Mali), which obviously include
some guarantee for quality as well. However, very often it will be difficult for developing
countries to maintain sufficient presence and visibility on the developed countries markets for the
label to be generally accepted and known. To establish the credibility of their brands and labels
may require extensive advertising campaigns. A less ambitious option would be to seek alliances
with established companies in OECD markets, and guarantee the required qualities through
cooperation in long-term contracts or joint ventures. In such undertakings developing countries
will have to fight for their share in total value added, and to avoid them becoming the raw
material producer at the upstream end of the chain, as in the colonial days. The foreign company
can supply technology, quality control and market access. As discussed in Chapter 6 the trend
towards vertical integration might undermine the tariffication and access objectives of WTO
itself, since it becomes hard to monitor the full pricing within a chain, while product
differentiation automatically restricts access for unlabelled products. Here also the main
challenge for LDCs is to avoid on the one hand being pushed in the segment of low priced,
unlabelled products of unspecified origin, and on the other to negotiate reasonable terms with the
foreign companies that offer coverage by a reputed label. For this they need market information,
as well as technological and legal advice, and active trade representatives abroad to promote their
interests.
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To the extent that trade liberalization could increase fluctuations in farm prices, contract
farming becomes a more attractive option that allows to share price as well as climatic risks
among the various agents in the food chain wherever they live. The drawback of this system is
that it tends to weaken the farmer’s position, since his supply is inelastic in the short term and the
number of processors and supermarket chains is generally small. While in the past this problem
has all over the world led to the creation of farm cooperatives for processing and marketing,
currently, under the pressures of competition, these cooperatives are in most countries being
dismantled or converted into private corporations. Therefore, the trend towards trade
liberalization and vertical integration carries with it a real danger of rural sectors turning into
colonial plantations that subjugate their workers. Fortunately, if consumer awareness proves
sufficient, it will be possible to implement a code of conduct that avoids excesses, since after all
the issue exhibits many similarities with the question of labor standards.
 In short, Ethiopia like many other LDCs may choose to focus its development efforts on the
alleviation of domestic supply constraints to provide remunerative employment for its fast
growing population, and not to pay much attention to upcoming concerns of rich consumers in
OECD countries. But it will have to export agriculture-based goods to buy the equipment and
technology necessary for its development. It will therefore have to meet quality standards and
gain recognition for its products, and need international support to succeed.
Knowledge, intellectual property rights and imperfect competition
Besides product differentiation, the internalization of knowledge within the company is an
important force towards vertical integration and increased scale. Developing countries face this
trend and see ever fewer and larger foreign companies supplying critical inputs such as seeds for
high yielding varieties, medicines or equipment for electricity plants. For LDCs like Ethiopia two
aspects stand out. One is access to knowledge, the other imperfect competition.
Patents and licenses. Regarding access, the knowledge available within the vertically integrated
firm is not available publicly, except and only in part through patents and licenses, for which a
price has to be paid to an owner who has been given a monopoly as reward for past R&D efforts.
In the absence of IPRs companies will avoid sharing any knowledge with outsiders. The trend
towards vertical integration will then become stronger, and only products that cannot be
duplicated will leave the R&D intensive firm. Hence, developing countries have some interest in
promoting recognition of IPRs, to avoid exclusion. Yet to really be part of the action they will
presumably have to acquire shares in firms rather than licenses. A problem is also that IPRs
create new monopolies that need to be monitored carefully. If patents that form close substitutes
come into a single hand, the owner acquires a power to extract rents. Recent development in bio-
technology have led to a fast and poorly monitored expansion and accumulation of IPRs within
the agro-industry, on the input side especially in relation to seeds as well as in food processing.
Furthermore, it becomes important to treat IPRs in a balanced way. Developing countries may
find it more difficult to organize themselves so as to establish their rights in due time. For
example, the international seed industry often goes out to collect some indigenous varieties in
Africa as genetic material for its breeding programs. These varieties can usually be collected on
public land and therefore without any payment to the “owner” of the genetic resource.
Nonetheless, once a new variety will have been developed, the farmers of the region concerned
have to pay the full price for the new, patented seeds. One could argue that these farmers should
share in the benefits from the patents. Similarly, inventions often benefit greatly from user
feedback. Past users should share in the current proceeds of a patent. The upcoming WTO round
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places much emphasis on TRIPS negotiations. Developed countries generally protest that LDCs
should improve their protection of IPRs, whereas LDCs generally want shorter periods of patent
protection than developed countries to facilitate their engagement in product imitation. It will
include further elaboration of the TRIPS agreement, which is now under evaluation (Downes and
Stilwell, 1998), especially of its application in LDCs. At present, opinions seem to differ but it
appears that no strong arguments can be made for international harmonization of IPRs
(Deardorff, 1990; Mayer, 1998).
Imperfect competition. Next, we return to the issue of competition. Ironically, it could happen that
imperfect competition on international markets favors poor countries in that it permits to maintain
a system with market segmentation that enables the poor to acquire goods at lower prices they
would be unable to obtain under competitive conditions. Imperfect competition does not always
make the product more expensive for them, but it may, and it is clear that monopolies in the seed
or the pharmaceutical industry pose a serious threat to developing countries. Whereas OECD
countries have created elaborate procedures to monitor competition internally, there is very little
to match these efforts at the international level. The markets within developing countries
themselves are often too small to offer a niche to many competitors either in imports or domestic
production. It would greatly help these developing countries if their governments or even better
their companies were given the opportunity to make use of the legal institutions and procedures
of the developed countries to monitor competition. In addition, a LDC could request developed
countries to extend their competition laws to its territory. Companies with headquarters in the
EU, and their subsidiaries, would then have to fulfill the EU requirements on competition
wherever they operate, and EU competition authorities and courts could punish offenses. This
approach has the advantage that it does not require any multilateral agreement, though the
monitoring cost might be relatively high. It should also be noticed that imperfect competition
does not always come from abroad. Indeed, domestic efforts towards vertical integration, say,
between tanneries and shoe factories may be conducive to the formation of cartels which are
initially successful in reaching the international market but eventually lack dynamism, innovative
power or willingness to invest its profits. This will prevent them moving up the quality scale and
acquiring a greater share in processing. 
Knowledge creation and labor mobility . Even if patents and licenses are accessible for
developing countries and adequately priced, an equally important issue for development is how to
participate actively in corporate decisions on product cycles and new investments. In the
knowledge intensive economy participation of qualified staff in the production process becomes
as important for development as participation in the firm’s equity shares and formal negotiations
between the management of foreign companies and the national government. One implication is
that training of local staff becomes a global issue. It is impossible for local staff to participate
fully in the company if it cannot visit headquarters and foreign branches for extended periods.
Therefore, it is important for developing countries to ensure that the appropriate visa can be
obtained. This issue might be dealt with under the TRIMS agreement.
Biogenetic resources. Some developing countries have a special interest in the negotiations on
intellectual property rights, as they supply themselves the main biogenetic resources for
development of new varieties. The Convention on Biological Diversity acknowledges benefit
sharing by the countries of origin but applications of these regulations are not yet known.
Furthermore, the origin of much biogenetic material available at gene banks is hard to establish,
since ‘passport’ information is often missing, and this makes it hard to establish ownership.
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Nonetheless, for Ethiopia the issue is of significant economic interest as it is a recognized
Vavilov center of biodiversity. Through history it has contributed significantly to currently
available genetic resources. Coffee is, of course, a prime example, but also some barley and
sorghum varieties nowadays used in the USA were developed using genetic material from
Ethiopia (ESTC, 1996). It would therefore be important for Ethiopia to see these rights
recognized. However, a conflict of interest will emerge with other developing countries, if the
latter also have to pay for licenses for which Ethiopia shares in the proceeds. This conflict will be
less severe if the question is treated as part a general attribution of property rights over a wider
range environmental resources, including the ocean and the atmosphere, because the income
earned from users of these resources combined would presumably generate positive flows to all
developing countries.
7.4 Conclusion
The difficulties encountered in reaching consensus on the agenda suggest that one has to be very
optimistic to expect that negotiations for a new agreement on agriculture will be concluded within
a year or two. One complicating factor are the presidential elections in the USA and the fact that
the president of the USA lacks ‘fast track’ authority from the Congress, which makes it less
attractive for other parties such as the EU to make firm commitments. Most countries are well
aware of the need to avoid a situation where agriculture once more becomes a major stumbling
block, if progress is to be made on other fronts.
Priority was until now given to the reduction of export subsidies and the de-coupling of
producer support in developed countries. The import access for LDCs has only recently received
major attention but within the domain of trade liberalization, the deeper challenges come from
regionalization on the one hand and new economy issues on the other. Clearly, LDCs will be
reluctant to join regional groupings that do not function because of poor administration or
political tensions, or that are an impediment to trade with the rest of the world. There are no
general solutions in  this regard. With respect to the new economy issues, LDCs have good
opportunities to join the vertical integration process so as to import knowledge, improve the
quality control and grading, and produce under reputed labels. But they should be allowed to
participate on their own terms. Opening up to trade and investment can be an effective means to
import knowledge and to improve discipline in budgetary, monetary and various other spheres. It
can also serve to increase the number of competitors and thus to promote competition on the
internal market but opening up to monopolists can be dangerous, and under monopolistic
competition the merits of the free trade project itself become questionable.
Indeed, developing countries might call for an international competition policy when
asked to make concessions in other fields. They might also insist that free trade and competition
should be looked at in their wider context. We would argue that five strongly interconnected
themes can capture their main areas of interest. These are free trade, free competition, free
movement of natural persons, fair assignment of property rights over environmental resources,
and open access to national courts for trade related issues. While the sum of the various agenda
proposals made in Seattle would indicate that all five themes will be covered in the Millennium
round, the eventual lack of consensus might also imply that they will be discarded or relegated to
marginal committees.
Finally, the non-governmental groups and movements who oppose the WTO process
itself because they fear a loss of cultural identities may deserve more serious reply than they
received until now. It may well be that their criticisms were not expressed in terms trade
economists can deal with, but the fact remains that international competition necessarily causes
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destruction. It is precisely designed as a disciplining mechanism to keep people on the edge.
Many are tired of being subjected to it or do not consider themselves ready. They fail to see how
any international body that was not elected by direct voting can ever possess the authority to
impose such rules. In the past, national governments have often reacted by arguing that the WTO
should improve on its public relations but they have come to realize that problem is far deeper.
Nonetheless, in our view these are the legitimate concerns of those who are free to choose their
lifestyle and who have through their democratic channels the possibility of restricting the scope
of the WTO. For the poorest of the poor living in Ethiopia, economic growth is the only way out
of current misery and malnutrition, after many years of unsuccessful experiments with central
planning, opening up to the market is the only alternative.
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